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This thesis surveys the military history of the Philippine-American War of 1899-
1902. In particular, this thesis looks at that war through the lens of hard war as a way of 
war. It begins with an introduction to hard war as a concept and a historiography of the 
Philippine-American War and continues with an overview of the events leading up to the 
war. The first two chapters deal with the wider role of the U.S. Army during the war, 
while the third chapter examines the role of James Franklin Bell, and American officer, 
and his command of the Third Separate Brigade in Batangas Province. This thesis is an 
attempt to place the Philippine-American War into the discussion of hard war in 
American military history. 
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Between 1899 and 1902, the U.S. Army fought an often-overlooked war to 
establish American control of the Philippines.  The Philippine-American War followed 
the Spanish-American War, but despite being larger in scale, the Philippine-American 
War has been called a “hidden war.”1  This is not for lack of involvement, because at its 
height 70,000 U.S. troops were stationed in the Philippines.  When President Theodore 
Roosevelt finally declared victory in July 1902, the U.S. Army’s mission was not 
finished.  America was only beginning its colonial rule of the Philippines, which lasted 
until the Second World War and included a sizable U.S. military presence on the islands.  
Despite the U.S. declaration of victory, combat operations to pacify the Philippines 
continued well past 1902. The Army had pacified the Northern and largely Catholic 
segments of the Philippines but still fought a campaign against the Muslim Moro people 
in the Southern Philippines until 1913.2 
The Philippine-American War should not be remembered as a sidebar to the 
Spanish-American War. It is far more complex.  In fact, while the Spanish-American War 
remained limited in scope and only lasted a few months, American fighting in the 
																																								 																				
1	Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands 
at the Century’s Turn (New York, N.Y.: History Book Club, 2006), ix. 
2	James R. Arnold, The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 
1902-1913, First Edition (Bloomsbury Press, 2011). For further reading on the Moro War, see James 
Arnold’s work on the subject.	
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Philippines was larger in scale and turned into counter-insurgnecy warfare lasting for 
years.  Because the Army adapted to fight a hard war3 in the Philippines in response to an 
insurgency, the war was not an exception to the American way of war – and certainly was 
not just about garrison duty.  Instead, this paper will argue that the Philippine-American 
War shows how the U.S. Army resorted to hard war in order to achieve victory after 
decisive battles did not defeat the Filipinos. 
Of the American commanders in the Philippine-American War, James Franklin 
Bell is perhaps the clearest practitioner of hard war tactics.  Bell was not only a model 
soldier – he won a Medal of Honor in 1899 for single-handedly capturing several Filipino 
insurgents while leading a patrol –  he was also a career soldier who conducted a 
successful counterinsurgency campaign in Batangas province between December 1901 
and May 1902.  His campaign ended Filipino resistance in the region and was hailed by 
Bell’s peers. However, he was also criticized for the hardships the campaign placed on 
the Filipino people.  This thesis will show how the Philippine-American War became a 
hard war, and how James Franklin Bell practiced hard war in Batangas province. 
WAYS OF HARD WAR 
Understanding hard war and how it fits into the idea of an American way of war 
requires context. One of the groundbreaking works arguing for an American way of war 
was published in 1973.  Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War: A History of 
United States Military Strategy and Policy examined American military history from the 
																																								 																				




American Revolution to the Vietnam War.4  For Weigley, the U.S. Civil War ushered in a 
new period of American warfare. When General Sherman took his Union forces on the 
infamous March to the Sea in late 1864 – destroying railroads, taking food and livestock, 
and burning houses and barns - thus making Southerners "feel the hard hand of war," he 
also shaped an American way of war that, later fully realized, became total war.  The 
U.S. military began to shift from waging wars of attrition to waging wars of annihilation.  
From the Civil War onward, military strategy utilized full mobilization of society and the 
economy to achieve total victory.  For Weigley, such an American way of war only 
emerged once the nation had sufficient military power, following the industrialization of 
the economy and after a strong federal state had developed.  Earlier conflicts, on the other 
hand, were limited by the scope of America’s military capability.5 
Weigly’s thesis, though, relied on two kinds of war: limited war and a complete 
overthrow of the enemy.6  Yet American military history is filled with examples, as even 
Weigley admits, that do not neatly fit into those two categories.  Mark Grimsley’s book, 
The Hard Hand of War:Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians 1861-1865,7 
argued instead that Union treatment of Southern noncombatants blended a mix of 
destruction aimed at civilian property and the Southern economy, while exercising 
restraint for the actual lives of Southern civilians.  Initially, Grimsely argues, the Union 
adopted a conciliatory policy towards the South. This policy changed over time towards 
																																								 																				
4 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977). 
5 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), xx–xxiii. 
6 Ibid., xx–xxi. 
7 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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coercion, and Sherman’s raid became a centerpiece by using destruction aimed at the 
Southern economy while maintaining a degree of restraint.8 
In fact, Grimsley offers a definition of hard war that applies just as much to Bell 
in the Philippine–American War as it does to Generals Sherman or Sheridan during the 
U.S. Civil War: “The erosion of the enemy’s will to resist by deliberately or 
concomitantly subjecting the civilian population to the pressures of war.”9 And while the 
Union army had a wide range of acceptable targets, it understood limits to its destruction.  
Both in the Civil War, as Grimsley argued, and during Bell’s campaign in the Philippines 
the U.S. Army was willing to resort to hard war.10 
Unlike Weigley, Brian Linn in his The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War 11 
in 2007 argued that "small" and “unconventional wars” – and not just major conflicts 
such as the U.S. Civil War or peacetime defense policies and strategies – also shaped the 
American way of war.  Similarly, Max Boot’s 2002 book The Savage Wars of Peace: 
Small Wars and the Rise of American Power12 also examined wars that were small in 
scale.  Even more important, as Boot argued, these types of conflicts occurred far more 
often than those major conflicts that Weigley and many others most often identified with 
the American way of war.  Boot thereby used a nineteenth-century British officer’s 
definition to explain small wars as “campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and 
																																								 																				
8 Ibid., 208–15. 
9 Ibid., 5.	
10 Ibid., 4–5. 
11 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
12 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, Revised Edition 
(New York: Basic Books, 2014). 
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guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against 
opponents who will not meet them in the open field.”13 
While Grimsley, Boot, and Linn offered nuance or counterpoint to Weigley’s 
thesis, a more recent work set out to cover territory uncharted by Weigley.  In 2008 John 
Grenier added his work, The First Way of War: American Warmaking on the Frontier.14  
In it, Grenier argued that colonial and early national American ways of war had a distinct 
nature.  These wars even approached the wars of annihilation that Weigley contended 
only emerged later in American history.  Grenier made the case that English colonists and 
early Americans carried out extirpative war against American Indians.  When colonists 
struggled to defeat American Indians in battle, they resorted to attacking non-combatants, 
villages, and food supplies.  This kind of war resembled hard war, and at points became 
war of annihilation.15 
Hard war in the American lexicon became defined as a rejection of conventional 
battles between armies, instead granting legitimacy to attacking the enemy’s economy 
and inflicting hardship upon civilians.16  As General Philip Sheridan stated,   
“Death is popularly considered the maximum of punishment in 
war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more 
surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life, as the 
selfishness of man has demonstrated in more than one great conflict.”17 
																																								 																				
13 Ibid., xvii. 
14 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814, First Edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
15 See also, Linn, The Echo of Battle, 69. 
16 Matthew Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts: Soldiers, Civilians, and the American Way of War (New York: The 




Almost 40 years before Bell, General William Sherman carried out this type of 
war in the South during the American Civil War.  He attacked the southern economy 
directly, even ignoring the major Confederate forces left operating against him.  
Contemporary to Sherman, General Sheridan carried out a similar campaign in the 
Shenandoah Valley in mid-1864.  Prior to the Civil War, both Sherman and Sheridan had 
experienced the nation’s frontier way of war, as they each fought against American 
Indians and served in garrison duty.	 They brought this experience to the Civil War and 
adapted lessons from the frontier to their campaigns against the South.18  They attacked 
the enemy's economy, logistics, and stamina, not just the enemy's army.  And they 
maneuvered to break not only the South's ability but also the South's will to fight.19  
In the American West in the nineteenth century, the government also pursued 
policies designed to control Native Americans by limiting their movement and destroying 
one of their main food sources, buffalo.  This indirect way of dealing with Native 
Americans was devastating to their population and greatly reduced their ability to fight.  
Two 2016 books demonstrate the way that the U.S. Army conducted warfare against 
Native Americans. Peter Cozzens’ The Earth is Weeping: The Epic Story of the Indian 
Wars for the American West 20 and David Silverman’s Thundersticks: Firearms and the 
Violent Transformation of Native America 21 both demonstrate the hard wars that the 
Army carried out on the frontier.  As Silverman contends, native warriors could contend 
																																								 																				
18 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 75–76. 
19 Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts, 54–59. 
20 Peter Cozzens, The Earth Is Weeping: The Epic Story of the Indian Wars for the American West, First 
Edition (New York: Knopf, 2016). 
21 David J. Silverman, Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America 




with the U.S. cavalry when close to even terms, but they could not resist the damage done 
when the Army attacked their people, homes, and food.22 
The campaigns of the Civil War and the American West were well known to Bell.  
He graduated from West Point in the decades following the Civil War and was twice 
assigned to the infamous 7th Cavalry Regiment.  As this thesis argues, Bell is linked to a 
wider American way of war by his own hard war that he waged against the Philippine 
Insurrection in the winter of 1901-1902.  He directed force against the insurgent’s civilian 
support.  Bell gained control of the population by forcing them into U.S. controlled 
“reconcentration zones” and attacked the Filipinos' ability to wage war by destroying 
their resources, especially food.   
The following pages will show how Bell’s campaign in Batangas was an example 
of hard war and how the Philippine-American war evolved into that level of conflict. 
While it stopped short of the extirpative wars against American Indians, it moved far 
beyond a limited war. Bell’s campaign in Batangas defeated one of the last major Filipino 
holdouts, but also brought terrible suffering to the Filipino population. By exposing 
civilians to the violence of the conflict, Bell and the U.S. Army resorted to a strategy 
common to other American wars, both before and after it.  Hard war in American military 
history can trace its roots to the colonial era, and Bell’s campaign was another step in that 







This thesis is a case study of the Philippine-American War as a hard war and 
James Franklin Bell's key role in this conflict.  Far from a simple handover from Spain or 
occupational duty for the American Army, the conflict in the Philippines was a complex 
and violent undertaking.  However, because of the limited scope of this project, the 
following chapters will not explore in full the Filipino Army23 and insurrection in its 
entirety.24 As much as they deserve scholarly work, this thesis is about the U.S. and Bell's 
role in the conflict.  This thesis is neither about American public opinion about the war, 
nor foreign policy at home.25 Similarly, it would have been outside the scope of this 
project to deal fully with national26 or individual identity27 in this conflict.   
This paper is primarily about American military operations in the Philippines 
during 1898-1902, as such it avoids many other interesting and relevant topics which 
deserve treatment. However, one important topic cannot be avoided because of how 
thoroughly embedded in the subject it became. Race and the racism of the day were 
central to American understandings of the war. This was a racially charged conflict. 28  
Both in the way that American soldiers dealt with Filipinos and in the administration’s 
																																								 																				
23 Luis Camara Dery, The Army of the First Philippine Republic and Other Historical Essays (Malate, 
Manila, Philippines: De La Salle University Press, 1995). 
24 O. D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation. Two Volumes, 2nd Edition (Aklahi Foundation, Inc., 
1989). 
25 Richard E. Welch, Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-
1902, First Edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979). 
26 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines, 1989. 
27 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-
American and Philippine-American Wars, 6th Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
28 Willard B. Gatewood Jr, Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden, 1898-1903, First Edition 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975). 
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policies towards the islands.  From enlisted men to general officers, soldiers viewed the 
Filipinos as lesser and frequently stated so explicitly.  It is important to remember these 
attitudes when discussing the level of destruction that American soldiers carried out 
during the war and the lack of punishment for the excesses that came with that 
destruction.  
Officials and the public back home did not consider the Filipinos capable of self-
rule which went hand in hand with the imperialism of the time.  Racism towards, and 
mistreatment of Filipinos created contradictions for African-Americans, both in the 
United States and those that were ordered to the Philippines as part of segregated units.  
Observing a country that was unwilling to treat them as citizens, they had to also fight to 
expand control over other people who Americans did not treat as equal.29 
What the reader will encounter is an account of the Philippine-American War 
centered around James Franklin Bell.  The first chapter is an overview of how the war 
began, from the Battle of Manila Bay in May,1898 until the dissolution of the Filipino 
Revolutionary Army in December 1899.  The second chapter is an examination of how 
the war changed from a conventional conflict between two standing armies in 1899 into a 
guerrilla or counter-insurgency war in early 1900.  This chapter examines the American 
response to that shift and concludes by showing how the Americans found success by the 
summer of 1901.  The third chapter is an examination of James Franklin Bell's hard war 
in Batangas Province in Southern Luzon between December 1901 and May 1902.   
																																								 																				
29 David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, First Edition 




Together the three chapters will show that the Philippine-American War might 
have begun as a conventional conflict, limited in scope, but soon became a 
counterinsurgency war when the defeat of the Filipino Revolutionary Army failed to end 
resistance to U.S. occupation.  The U.S. then fought this new conflict by resorting to hard 
war tactics, taken to their fullest measure by James Franklin Bell in Batangas province. 
In both this introduction and throughout, this thesis uses the term Philippine-
American War.30  But the name Philippine-American War describes more than one 
unified event. Initially, the conflict involved Filipinos and Americans fighting together.  
During the period from February 1899 until December 1899, two organized field armies 
fought each other in conventional terms.  By 1900, the war had turned into a guerrilla war 
as Filipino leadership dissolved their field army in the face of severe losses. Where 
applicable, this thesis uses the name Filipino Revolutionary Army.  However, because of 
the nature of the war after December 1899, the thesis introduces the terms insurrection, 
insurgents, or insurgency to describe Filipino combatants.  Another term, pacification, is 
how journalists, soldiers, and even those at home referred to the war at the time.31  The 
common usage of both pacification and insurrection influenced the decision to use those 
terms, even if they do not fully represent the nature of the conflict.  This thesis does not 
intend to glorify the American Army or Bell's success in the war.  Instead, it will attempt 
to argue that the success they achieved was linked to the kind of war they fought.  The 
thesis will also argue that although this may be a limited study of operations and tactics in 
																																								 																				
30 David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, First Edition 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), i–xviii. For additional discussion of the issues surrounding how 
historians refer to the conflict Silbey’s introduction offers a thoughtful analysis. 
31 Gregg Jones, Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of 
America’s Imperial Dream, First Edition (New York: NAL, 2012), 204.	
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one American conflict at the end of the nineteenth century.  Bell’s campaign sheds light 
on and offers lessons about other U.S. conflicts. 
SOURCES AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
For primary material, this thesis relied on Bell’s papers, which are housed at the 
U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.32  The documents in the collection are 
his original telegraphic circulars, written commands to subordinates as a General Officer 
that dictated how Bell fought a counter-insurgency.  Bell’s orders show how he 
implemented hard war in Batangas Province, and while they are only limited to his 
official role and not his personal writings, he details both the reasoning behind his orders 
along with the specifics of how his subordinates should carry them out.   
Various regimental histories appeared throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, but 1939 saw the first history of the Philippine-American War.  William Sexton 
published his work Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism that year.33  Sexton 
largely defended American actions in the Philippines and he attributed American military 
success to the capabilities of junior officers and enlisted soldiers.  He acknowledged that 
there were some excesses by American troops, but that they were limited in scale.  He 
asserted that the reconcentration camps were humane and that suffering could be blamed 
on continued resistance but did not attribute the use of reconcentration zones as a 
deciding factor in the conflict.  Sexton’s work is predominantly a traditional military 
																																								 																				
32 James Franklin Bell, Adna Romanza Chaffee, and Lloyd Wheaton, James Franklin Bell Papers, 1902, 
U.S. Army Military History Institute. 
33 Sexton, William T., Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism (Harrisburg, PA: The Military 
Service Publishing Company, 1939). 
12	
	
history but it is among the only histories written within the lifetimes of the veterans of the 
war. 
The next major historical work on the Philippine-American War was Leon 
Wolff’s Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the 
Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn.34  First published in 1961, Wolff’s work was a 
more comprehensive study of the war, if still incomplete.  Wolff painted the war in stark 
terms and even went so far as to declare it a “moral wrong.”35  In both Wolff’s and 
Sexton’s works, the books ended before the war did; that is to say, they recount the war 
until Aguinaldo’s capture.  The events after that date, including Bell’s campaign in 
Batangas, were not discussed at length but rather became mere epilogues.  
A counter point to Wolff emerged in 1973 when John Gates authored 
Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines 1898-1902.36  Gates 
acknowledged the damage done to the Army’s reputation and understood the popular 
image of the Army in the Philippines as one of widespread misconduct.  His work argued 
for a different image of the Army, one of both military and humanitarian work during the 
conflict.  Gates attributed America’s successful pacification of the islands to the ability of 
American military and civil governors to win over Filipinos through public 
improvements as much as he credits American military action.  
																																								 																				
34 Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands 
at the Century’s Turn (New York, N.Y.: History Book Club, 2006). 
35 Ibid., 366. 
36 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902, First 
Edition (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1973).	
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While not as broad as some areas of military history, secondary literature on the 
Philippine-American War was forthcoming.  By the 1990s, authors began to write more 
focused works on the war.  An example highly relevant to this thesis is Glenn May’s 
Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War, 37 which he published in 1991.  May 
did not cast his book as merely another military history.  Instead, May’s work studied the 
movement that opposed the Americans in that province. 
 May determined that the role of the U.S. Army in Batangas is somewhere 
between the benevolent peacekeepers and ruthless counter-insurgents previously 
portrayed, but that the Army ultimately still caused the civilian loss of life in Batangas.  
He argued that Bell’s campaign compounded already serious food shortages and 
environmental factors that led to high numbers of civilian deaths.  His study included a 
deeper examination of the Filipino resistance than many other works, although it was 
limited to one region, and concluded that local elites led the resistance.  Once they 
realized the benefit to be gained from accepting American rule and saw the disastrous 
effects of further fighting, they worked within American rule rather than against it.  
In more recent years, several authors have added to the literature on the 
Philippine-American War.  Most notably, Brian Linn wrote two books: The Philippine 
War 1899-1902 38 and The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 
1899-1902.39  Linn made a case for the Philippines not as a war of terror, but as a local 
																																								 																				
37 Glenn Anthony May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War, First Edition (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1991). 
38 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). 
39 Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, First 
Edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
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war that varied widely among villages, towns, and provinces throughout the Philippines.  
Linn added to the scholars arguing a case for the American military outperforming the 
Filipinos on the battlefield and balancing combat with social reform to win over 
Filipinos.   
Worthy of mention, several of these books have drawn comparisons to counter-
insurgency wars, including those in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  Some books have 
even placed the Philippine-American War within the wider context of twentieth-century 
insurgency warfare like James Arnold’s Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counter-
Insurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq.40 Even writers within the military 
began reassessing the Philippine-American War as the U.S. Army was engaged in two 
counter-insurgency wars during the 2000s.  Two prime examples beings Lessons From a 
Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902 by Timothy Deady41 and All 
Wars are Local: Lessons From the Philippine Insurrection by Todd Brost.42   
To compare the Philippine-American War with prior U.S. conflicts, historians 
need to look at works like Matthew Carr’s Sherman’s Ghosts: Soldiers, Civilians, and the 
American Way of War.43  Carr’s book does not a directly examine the Philippine-
American War.  Rather he relates Sherman’s hard war to other American conflicts.  Carr 
drew a link between the Civil War and the Philippine-American War.  In another recent 
work, Max Boot wrote Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American 
																																								 																				
40 James R. Arnold, Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to 
Iraq, First Edition (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009). 
41 Timothy K. Deady, “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902” (DTIC 
Document, 2005)  
42 Todd Brost, “All Wars Are Local: Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection” (DTIC Document, 2009). 
43 Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts, 2015.	
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Power 44 in order to examine the ways that the smaller conflicts throughout our history 
have shaped the American way of war.  Boot placed the Philippines in the context of 
conflicts like the Barbary Wars or American interventions in Central and South America.  
Ultimately the historiography of the Philippine-American war has centered on re-
examining the U.S. Army’s role in the conflict, and this thesis has much in common with 








44 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, Revised Edition 





CHAPTER 1: CONVENTIONAL WAR 
Early on the morning on May 1st, 1898 Commodore George Dewey ordered the 
captain of the USS Olympia to open fire on the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in the 
Philippines.  This naval battle sparked U.S. involvement in the Philippines for the next 
half century.  On paper, the forces were roughly equal, seven ships to a side.  The 
Spanish also had some supporting artillery on the island of Corregidor.  However, the 
Spanish ships were obsolete and outgunned compared to Dewey’s modern armored 
cruisers.  The Spanish commander had recognized his low chances of victory and had 
placed his ships in shallow water in the hope of giving his sailors the opportunity to swim 
ashore.  His fears proved well founded, as accurate American gunfire destroyed his fleet.  
The casualty list showed similar results, 371 Spanish casualties to nine American 
wounded and one American dead from heatstroke.  Dewey's victory at Manila Bay turned 
him into a national hero and put America on a path to further involvement in the 
Philippines that would lead to the Philippine-American War the following year.45  
 The Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars would open a new chapter 
in American military history.  The major campaigns of the Plains Wars against Native 
Americans were over.  For many soldiers and officers, the coming conflict would be an 
opportunity after years of career stagnation.  For the country, it was a chance to step onto 
																																								 																				
45 David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, First Edition 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 37–39. 
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the world's stage.  For James Franklin Bell the Philippine-American War propelled his 
career from a circuit riding garrison lieutenant and teacher into a Medal of Honor 
recipient and, eventually, U.S. Army Chief of Staff. 
 Bell had been born in the town of Shelbyville, Kentucky in 1856, just a few years 
before the Civil War. He attended West Point and graduated in 1878, first posted to the 
9th Cavalry Regiment and within months to the 7th Cavalry Regiment.  He spent his 
years between graduation and his assignment to the Philippines in various stations in the 
Western United States. He spent time guarding railroads, teaching, serving as a judge 
advocate, and in garrisons from Arizona to South Dakota.46  Only a few pictures of Bell 
exist, but one is from his time as a lieutenant at Pine Ridge Indian Reservation with the 
7th Cavalry Regiment taken in 1890, although Bell was on leave at the time of the 
Massacre of Wounded Knee.47  When the Spanish-American War broke out Bell received 
orders that attached him to General Wesley Merrit's command as a Major of Volunteers.  
Bell distinguished himself, and by the end of the Philippine-American War he would be 
one of the Army's most respected commanders and the archetype of an American officer 
during the period. 
From the outset, American actions in the Philippines lacked direction as policy 
from Washington was either unclear or not communicated in time.  Dewey had won a 
victory, but at least for a time, no one seemed sure what to do with it.  War then erupted 
between the Filipinos and Americans before a well-defined American policy emerged – 
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and it was really the U.S. Army and Navy which drove the Mckinley Administration's 
decisions about the islands and not the other way around.  The initial successes by 
American forces also masked the formation of a Filipino guerrilla army that would soon 
fight an insurgency against the Americans until 1902.   
 Before American involvement in the Philippines, Filipinos had been in revolt 
against Spanish colonial rule.  The Philippines of the 1880s and 1890s had suffered 
economic hardship, crop and livestock loss, and disease.  These conditions created an 
environment for dissatisfaction and dissension.  This cultural climate spawned a Filipino 
revolution in the mid-1890s against Spanish rule.  The revolutionaries that emerged were 
groups that shared a common enemy but otherwise were split by longstanding class and 
ethnic divisions.  The Tagalog people were one of the most influential ethnic groups of 
the revolution.  One of their own, Emilio Aguinaldo, emerged as a leader that represented 
their interests in overthrowing Spanish rule but would keep the power among wealthy 
Filipino landowners.  Another significant faction in the Filipino revolution was the 
Katipunan.  This group consisted of farmers and merchants from the cities and was led by 
Andres Bonifacio.  
The competition between these groups hindered the revolt, and by 1897 Spain had 
gained the upper hand.  Emilio Aguinaldo demonstrated skill as a politician and was 
elected president of the revolutionary government.  His ascension to leadership marked 
trouble for his rival Bonifacio.  Aguinaldo ordered Bonifacio to be arrested on 
accusations of treason and executed him.  Later Aguinaldo claimed that he, in fact, had 
commuted Bonifacio’s death sentence, but that the order to stay the execution had not 
arrived in time.  Despite Aguinaldo’s clear leadership of the revolutionary forces, they 
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still struggled to make gains against the Spanish.  By August of 1897, the two sides began 
negotiations.  These negotiations resulted in a treaty which ended the revolution in 
exchange for payment to the Filipino revolutionary leaders whom Spain exiled to Hong 
Kong.  Neither side stayed faithful to its treaty obligations.  The Spanish only paid half of 
what they promised, and Aguinaldo placed much of the money into a bank account to 
fund later revolutionary efforts.48 
 While Aguinaldo waited for a chance to resume his revolution in the Philippines, 
the Spanish-American War broke out on the other side of the world.  This new war was 
the result of another revolt against Spanish rule.  At the time, Cuba was one of the last 
Caribbean holdings of the dwindling Spanish empire.  Cuban revolutionaries had proven 
more successful in their fight against Spain.  In response to a more aggressive and 
effective insurgency in Cuba, the Spanish responded with stringent measures.  The 
governor of Cuba was Valeriano Weyler, and among the policies that he implemented to 
quell the revolt was one known as Reconcentrado.49 
 Under this policy, Cuban civilians were forcibly moved by the Spanish military 
into zones that the Spanish controlled.  Spanish officials were unable to keep a steady 
food supply to these areas which led to malnourishment and starvation.  Weyler's 
Reconcentrado caused considerable outrage in the United States.  In the winter of 1901-
02, as a General, James Franklin Bell instated a similar policy to combat the Filipino 
insurgency, anti-imperialists decried his policies as “Weylerism.”50  
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 Weyler's policies led to a diplomatic intervention by the United States.  Spain 
recalled Weyler, and President McKinley offered to oversee peace negotiations between 
the Cuban revolutionaries and the Spanish.  In the meantime, President McKinley 
dispatched the USS Maine to Havana to protect American interests in the city.  On 
February 15, 1898, the Maine exploded and sunk.  The explosion killed 266 of the 350 
men onboard.  The sinking pushed existing tensions to the brink and stirred war 
sentiment in the United States.51 
 The cause of the explosion that sank the Maine was not immediately clear, and 
President McKinley ordered an investigation that became known as the Sampson Board.  
On March 21, 1898, the board concluded that the cause of the explosion had been a mine 
that had detonated the ship’s magazines.  The board’s investigation ignored a report from 
January of that year that had warned of the risk of a fire in the coal bunker detonating a 
ship’s magazine.  Studies since the explosion have placed serious doubt on the Sampson 
Board’s findings, most notably, a study by Admiral Hyman Rickover in 1974.  
Regardless of its accuracy and lack of a named culprit the Sampson Board’s finding of 
the external explosion was enough to push the U.S. Congress into demanding a Spanish 
withdrawal from Cuba, and allowing the use of force if they did not.52 
When America declared war in the spring of 1898 the country possessed only 
limited military capabilities.  At the end of the Civil War, the United States Army and 
Navy stood among the largest in the world.  The ranks of both services swelled because 
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of the emergency of the Civil War.  Once it was over, both demobilized down to prewar 
levels even more quickly than they had grown.  The Army reduced its strength to barely 
enough manpower to patrol the frontier and enforce reconstruction.  The Navy reverted to 
sail power to carry out its largely diplomatic functions.  This drastic reduction frustrated 
those within the military, but it fit the needs of the country.   
American strategy reverted, along with its manpower levels, to pre-Civil War 
doctrine of relying on coastal fortifications and the expanse of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans to protect the country.  For much of the remainder of the nineteenth-century 
American military thinking looked to the problem of defending its shores.  Even as late as 
1898 Army writings focused on hypothetical invasions that would require a major land 
force to defeat them, instead of the wars that they were about fight.53 
  The United States had few enemies, and only Britain or France had the 
capability of sending an invasion force to America. With limited budgets that reflected 
the lack of external threats, the military languished.  In the 1880s things began to reverse 
course, albeit slowly.  The Navy began receiving appropriations from Congress to build 
new steel warships and start the process of catching up on twenty years’ worth of naval 
innovation.  The resulting ships and modern guns they mounted would be the vessels that 
carried out the destruction of the Spanish fleet in 1898.54 
  The Army especially found itself unprepared for an overseas conflict.  At the 
height of the Civil War, over a million men were enlisted in the U.S. Army.  By 1875 that 
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number had dropped to 25,000.  Life in the army was short on pay and chances for 
promotion, and the men that enlisted often had few other options.  As many as one in 
seven deserted each year.  Pay for a private in the 1870s had dropped from thirteen 
dollars a month to ten.  Recruits received poor training and uniforms and often lived in 
marginal conditions.55  Officers of the era spent decades at the same rank.  Arthur 
MacArthur, later to command U.S. forces in the Philippines, achieved the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel during the Civil War.  Afterward, he spent 23 years as a captain.56  
 This small frontier garrison force was the army that James Franklin Bell had 
joined in the 1870s.  Bell spent his first twelve years in the Army as a 2nd Lieutenant and 
was not promoted to Captain until the Spanish-American War.  Despite his long service, 
Bell still managed to be the junior of many Army officers.  Shortly before the Spanish-
American War began, the Army reported that 271 of its captains and lieutenants had 
fought in the Civil War.  When war broke out with Spain over 100,000 Civil War 
veterans volunteered to fight.  This volunteerism included ex-Confederate Generals 
Joseph Wheeler and Fitzhugh Lee who were each appointed to commands in the newly 
raised volunteers.  A reporter favorably described the men of the army as “Generally 
stalwart, sunburnt, resolute-looking men, twenty-five to thirty-five years of age, who 
seemed to be in perfect physical condition, and who looked as if they had already seen 
hard service and were ready and anxious for more.”57  The description proved accurate, at 
least in part, since only 40 soldiers in the regular army in the spring of 1898 were under 
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the age of 21, and a third of all enlisted men had been in the Army for more than five 
years.58  
The war in the Philippines shared much with the Plains Wars that the Army had 
been fighting until that point.  Both saw the Army deployed to remote garrisons that were 
manned by a small unit.  In the Philippines, these posts were often manned by a company 
or less.  In both, the Army faced opponents that could be difficult to bring to battle and 
could melt away into difficult or vast terrain.  The Army would turn to forced relocation 
and indirect attacks on the enemy’s means to wage war to overcome these problems in 
each conflict.  A way of war that Secretary of War John Floyd explained as, “beating 
their forces, capturing many prisoners…destroying large amount of property, and laying 
waste to their country.”59 Floyd made his statement in 1858 to describe the way the Army 
had been fighting Native Americans on the frontier. A way of war which had frustrated 
many officers who focused on wars against western nations instead of the colonial style 
of warfare that had occupied the Army until that point.60  
The Plains Wars and the Philippine-American War also shared social 
characteristics. American soldiers faced isolation, frustration, and poor pay.  Their 
opponents were non-whites and soldiers often harbored racial prejudices towards their 
enemies.  The similarities of frontier duty in the American West and the Philippine-
American War, combined with the shift towards a reformed industrialized army in the 
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early 1900s, meant that the Philippine-American War would be the last major conflict of 
the frontier Army.61 
Despite the problems the Army faced, however, it brought strengths to the conflict 
that it had not anticipated and was not prepared to fight.  By the time the Philippine-
American War broke out, the long-serving veterans of the Army had begun to see some 
efforts at modernization, even if it was happening slowly.  During the 1870s and 80s, the 
Army had adopted new modern breech-loading artillery, including easily transportable 
mountain guns.  Small arms and infantry tactics underwent changes as well.  In the early 
1890s, the army switched from single-shot black powder rifles to magazine fed 
smokeless powder rifles.  However, many of the volunteer units still carried the older 
weapons well into the war.  Regulars and volunteers benefited from a new tactical 
manual issued in 1891 that emphasized open order, supporting fire, and advancing while 
using cover and short rushes.  While many of these changes were brought about in 
response to similar changes in European armies, they faced their first trial in the 
Philippines.62 
FROM SPANISH-AMERICAN TO PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR 
  The official declaration of war against Spain came on April 25th 1898 following 
an investigation into the cause of the USS Maine explosion.  The Philippines were not the 
immediate concern of most Americans, save for a few members of the Naval Department, 
including Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt.  Roosevelt ordered the 
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American squadron under Dewey to the Philippines.  Based on prewar plans to attack the 
Spanish Pacific Fleet, Roosevelt ordered Dewey to prepare to attack the Spanish at 
Manila.  Roosevelt's orders to Dewey, among others, caused the Secretary of the Navy, 
John Long, to worry that Roosevelt had done more to bring about war than the sinking of 
the Maine, but Long did not countermand them.  The eventual outcome of the battle of 
Manila Bay would be entirely one-sided, but while the American squadron readied itself 
in Hong Kong, observers there speculated on its defeat at the hand of well-prepared 
Spanish defenses, including mines and shore batteries, concerns eventually proven to be 
unfounded.63  
 While Dewey readied his squadron for war, Aguinaldo began his preparations to 
resume leadership of the insurgency against Spain.  Dewey's victory created a problem 
for McKinley who was unsure what to do in the Philippines.  In the meantime Filipinos 
had already begun to fight against the Spanish once again, assuming that they would 
receive American support for their cause.  Under local commanders, Filipino forces 
gained control of much of the Philippines and besieged Manila.  Although initially 
effective, this regional loyalty would later cause problems for the Filipino Army of 
Liberation.64 
 Meanwhile, Aguinaldo was in communication with the American consulate in 
Singapore. The meetings there became a source of controversy almost immediately.  
Aguinaldo claimed that he had been promised American support for Filipino 
																																								 																				
63 Wolff, Little Brown Brother, 2006, 45–55.	
64 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, Revised Edition 
(New York: Basic Books, 2014), 104. 
26	
	
independence and self-rule.  American officials denied having ever promised that to 
Aguinaldo, but Dewey did give him military supplies, including rifles and orders for U.S. 
agents to purchase more in Hong Kong.  Aguinaldo used money which had been on hand 
since Spain's payment years earlier to order 2,000 modern Mauser rifles, along with 
200,000 rounds of ammunitions for just over $20,000.  He provided nearly $70,000 more 
to buy up additional munitions and supplies for the Revolutionary Army.65 The U.S. may 
have come to regret facilitating these arms purchases as capturing arms later became a 
primary objective for U.S. commanders fighting the Filipinos.  With these weapons and 
aid from the U.S., Aguinaldo began organizing a Filipino government and army to wage 
war against the Spanish.66 
 Officially Dewey's objective had been to prevent the Spanish fleet from attacking 
the American West Coast, but realistically the lopsided victory at Manila Bay had 
achieved much more.  The Philippines were on the table now as a possible territorial 
gain, instead of just Cuba. Initially, McKinley did not create an official stance about 
taking the Philippines from Spain, but he did order the War Department to send troops.  
As effective as the American Navy was against the Spanish, it was not equipped to seize 
any territory.  The first 2,500 troops departed on May 25th.  On the way, these forces 
sailed to Guam, and on their arrival, the Spanish commander met them in a small boat to 
apologize that he had no cannon to offer a salute, unaware of the war since word of 
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hostilities had not reached the island.  More troops left for the Philippines in June, 3500 
on the 15th and 4800 on the 27th.67 
 The American soldiers arrived in Manila to find an unusual three party siege of 
the city. The Spanish held Manila with a garrison of approximately 15,000 men.  
Aguinaldo had surrounded the city on land with a roughly equivalent number of his own 
troops.  The Filipino army was weakened by Aguinaldo's decision to send additional 
forces to aid in the war in the provinces and was unable to breach the Spanish defenses. 
Dewey maintained a naval blockade of the city, and the American army landed at Cavite, 
near Manila, but did not take a place in the trenches alongside the Filipino Army of 
Liberation.  Officers within the American 8th Corps had to negotiate to take over a 
portion of the Filipino lines next to the shoreline on the south side of Manila, next to the 
bay and the American naval guns floating offshore. While the American command, 
including 8th Corps intelligence officer James Franklin Bell, unsuccessfully searched for 
a weak point in the Spanish lines to their front, the American soldiers lived in wet 
trenches under fire from Spanish sharpshooters.68 
 Unfortunately for the Americans, there seemed to be no way to take the Spanish 
defenses other than a frontal assault.  Behind their lines, the Spanish colonial authorities 
had their own worries, most important their fear of what would happen if the Filipinos 
took the city and the 70,000 residents still living there.  The Spanish colonial government 
did not want to surrender to the Filipino forces, and the Spanish government did not want 
its commander to surrender at all.  When the governor general suggested capitulation, he 
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was sacked and replaced, but the new governor general agreed with his predecessor.  
With help from the Belgian Consulate, he secretly negotiated an agreement with the 
Americans that as long as the American Navy did not shell the city, then the Spanish 
batteries would not open fire.  Dewey believed that the Spanish only planned to offer 
token resistance, Merritt did not agree.  He felt that it only applied to the naval 
engagement, and kept the information from his officers.69   
 On August 13th, 1898, the Americans launched an attack during a rainstorm. 
Dewey's ships provided a bombardment of Spanish strongpoints while 8th Corps infantry 
advanced on the Spanish positions.  Whatever the understanding was between the two 
sides before the attack, Dewey's understanding was the one that played out.  Spanish 
defenders quickly retreated into the city and raised a white flag.  American soldiers 
moved into the walled city to disarm the garrison and keep the Filipinos from entering.70 
 The American success of capturing Manila again highlighted the uncertainty in 
American policy about what to do with the Philippines.  Following American victories in 
Cuba and the Philippines, Spain was eager to end the war before its losses started 
affecting domestic politics.  American concerns at home were centered on what to do 
with the islands during a congressional election year, fresh off military victories, and 
while war and expansionist sentiment were still high.  From the American perspective, 
Spain could not be allowed to keep the Philippines; there had been too much publicity of 
Spain's cruelty towards its colonial possessions.  
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 Letting the Filipinos gain control of the islands was never really an option either.  
The ideology of the day did not see them as fit for self-rule, and the U.S. desired a base in 
the Pacific that could give them influence and strategic access to Asia, especially China.  
The McKinley Administration assumed that to give control over to the Filipinos would 
result in another European power taking control of the islands.  A squadron of German 
warships as strong as Dewey's had been shadowing the American Pacific Squadron and 
had even sailed into Manila Bay and landed onshore.  At one point an American warship 
fired a warning shot at one of the German ships, and Dewy fumed at a German diplomat 
in a widely-reported encounter that only fueled speculation of European expansion.71  
European interest in China and other Asian countries made it seem like a plausible 
outcome.  America had seized part of the Philippines and could not give it up, and to take 
part meant it had to occupy the rest.  McKinley perceived that other outcomes would not 
be acceptable to American voters faced with an upcoming election, or within his 
administration, that was worried about rival powers in the Pacific.72 
 The U.S. went to the negotiating table with Spain and demanded all of the 
Philippines. Spain held a weak position, both strategically and politically at home.  Faced 
with American demands, Spain did not receive help from other European powers to try 
and curb America's gains.  To other European powers, it was better to let the Americans 
get the remnants of Spain's colonies than to see it go to another rival.  Without anything 
to bargain with or allies to help temper American demands, Spain gave the Americans 
what they wanted.  America received Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and, in exchange for $20 
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million, the whole of the Philippines.  The two countries signed the Treaty of Paris on 
December 10th, 1898, just under eight months from the outbreak of the war and less than 
a year since the sinking of the Maine. 73 
 Between the capture of Manila in August and the treaty in December, American, 
and Filipino forces had tenuously remained in place.  Aguinaldo's forces were still 
receiving regular supplies of weapons from Hong Kong.74  The Americans held the city 
and denied entry to the Army of Liberation which remained entrenched around the 
Manila.  James Franklin Bell, who had been assigned to Merritt's command as a Major of 
Volunteers, helped ease this situation somewhat by functioning as a negotiator.  The truce 
held, but a new American commander made matters worse.  General Elwell Otis replaced 
Merritt when Merritt was sent to France to help negotiate an end to the Spanish-American 
War.  Otis had been in the Army for more than thirty years when the Spanish-American 
War began.  He had fought on Little Round Top during the Battle of Gettysburg with the 
140th New York and continued fighting for the Union until he was wounded in the head 
during the Siege of Petersburg.  During his tenure in the Philippines, he became deeply 
unpopular with the American volunteers.  "Granny" Otis, as soldiers called him, was 
criticized by his contemporaries for his temperament, inability to delegate, and 
overreaching attention to detail.  He allegedly once went to verify the value on a dead 
mule.75 
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 Otis' faults exacerbated a tense situation that neither Otis nor Merritt were well-
equipped to handle.  Conditions in Manila were unpleasant and unsanitary, Filipino 
soldiers could enter the city unarmed, but would later face off against American soldiers 
along the lines outside the walled city, and neither commander was able to get clear 
instructions from the McKinley Administration.76 
 Otis quickly issued a letter to Aguinaldo that demanded the withdrawal of the 
Army of Liberation.  Unsurprisingly, Aguinaldo kept his army in place.  The tension 
between leaders was matched by tension between soldiers.  Patrols and sentries faced 
each other day after day, and disputes, including gunfire, had to be settled before they 
turned into an all-out battle.  
 News of the peace treaty reached the Philippines in January 1899 and only made 
tensions worse.  From the Filipino standpoint, the treaty represented a second betrayal 
following American seizure of Manila.  Aguinaldo issued a proclamation that denounced 
the treaty and warned of bloodshed. He also began to plan for war and started organizing 
forces within the city to take part in an uprising once the fighting began.  If the Filipinos 
could coordinate their efforts, then American forces stretched thinly along the perimeter 
of Manila would have to deal with hostile forces from two directions.  The treaty 
removed any remaining pretense of a peaceful solution to the ongoing standoff and drove 
home the possibility that any spark could be the one to bring about war. 77 
 The personal and military tensions were exacerbated by a clash of cultures. 
American attitudes towards Filipinos, both combatants and non-combatants, were 
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thoroughly racist.  The language that American soldiers used to describe Filipinos was 
often filled with the same racial slurs and epithets that were in use towards Native and 
African-Americans.  Even the soldiers and officers that saw some noble purpose in 
America's incursion into the Philippines often spoke of Filipinos as an inferior race.  To 
them, it was because of the Filipino's inability to rule themselves that the Americans were 
there in the first place. McKinley, Taft, Bell, and other figures all espoused this idea at 
one point.  Even reporters that discussed the harsh counter-insurgency campaign that Bell 
led listed the excesses of violence enacted by American soldiers, but went on to declare 
that the Filipinos were savages that only responded to violence.78  
At the time, there were voices of dissension, both in the Army and back in the 
United States, Mark Twain being one of the most famous.79  One of the apocryphal 
stories about the Philippine-American War that highlights the complicated and 
derogatory nature of the war comes from the arrival of the African-American 25th 
Infantry Regiment. When asked by a white soldier what they were doing there, a trooper 
from the 25th Infantry Regiment is reported to have replied that they were there to "Take 
up the white man's burden" referencing Rudyard Kipling’s poem about the Philippine-
American War.80 But despite some limited dissent, American troops largely thought of 
the Filipinos as "other."  Whether the view was based in a paternal racism that thought of 
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Filipinos as a society that needed American governance or outright racism that saw 
Filipinos as savages, American troops viewed and treated their enemy as an inferior race.  
 On February 4th 1899, tensions that had been building for months spilled over. 
Sometime around 8:30 that evening, three soldiers from 1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry 
Regiment were on patrol at a vulnerable point in the American line, close to one of the 
former Spanish blockhouses.  The American defense was stretched thin around Manila, 
most regiments covered their assigned areas with outposts and picket lines, with regular 
patrols to cover the gaps.  At this particular point in the line, tensions were already high, 
as the Nebraskan volunteers held a particularly exposed position that just days before had 
been the subject of a dispute about the neutral zone between the two armies.  What led to 
the firing is still debated, some sources claiming that the Filipinos were peacefully 
guarding their outpost, while others maintain that they approached the American patrol 
and refused to halt.  Many Filipino sources assert that Cpl. Anastascio Felix, along with 
two other soldiers were standing in the doorway to Blockhouse Number 7, one of the 
former Spanish positions, when Americans shot them.81 
  Regardless of the cause, what is generally agreed on is that Pvt. William Grayson 
fired the first shot that killed one of the Filipinos, followed in quick succession by two 
more shots from Grayson's companions.  Grayson offered his own account of what 
happened that evening. 
"I challenged with another "Halt." Then he immediately shouted "Halto" 
to me. Well I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped. 
Then two Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about fifteen feet from us. I 
called "Halt" and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw that another was left. 
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Well I think I got my second Filipino that time. We retreated to where six 
other fellows were and I said "Line up fellows; the niggers are here all 
through these yards."82   
 
As Grayson and his fellow Nebraskans ran back to their lines, firing spread to the 
rest of their unit, and soon spread to neighboring units and beyond until the entire 
perimeter was engaged in a sporadic firefight through most of the night.  Several 
American units reported heavy firing along with probing attacks on their positions.  
Sentries had fired on each other before, and there was little love among American 
soldiers for their Filipino counterparts.  By this point, both the Americans and Filipinos 
expected and were planning for a war when the firing started.  This time around there was 
no one in a position to stop it.83 
 By the next morning, the firefight evolved into a general engagement all around 
the city. The American Provost Guard in Manila proper quickly cracked down on 
suspected insurgents, and although a few managed to snipe or start fires, the feared two-
pronged attack never emerged, partly thanks to quick action on the part of the Americans, 
but mainly because the battle had taken the Filipinos by surprise as well.  Those who had 
been preparing an attack from within the city were not ready to act when the fighting 
began.84 
 Along the perimeter, the 8th Corps was divided into two divisions, the 1st under 
General Thomas Anderson defending the south side of the city, and the 2nd under 
General Arthur MacArthur defending the northern side.  Both commanders had 
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developed contingency plans in case of an outbreak of hostilities, and began to put their 
plans in motion with support from warships in the harbor and the Navy's gunboats in the 
Pasig River.  All along the line, American regiments launched attacks that drove back the 
Filipinos and captured their defenses.  Eager volunteers alongside the stalwart regulars 
made use of reformed tactics they had learned in the months since they had enlisted.  
They advanced in short rushes, using their own volleys of rifle fire and supporting 
artillery to cover their advance.  While there was some confusion and strong resistance at 
points, by the end of the day the Americans had soundly defeated the Army of 
Liberation.85 
  The Battle of Manila became the largest battle of the Philippine-American War, 
between 11,000 American soldiers, and maybe as many as 20,000 Filipinos. American 
casualties amounted to 44 killed and 194 wounded. Filipino losses are harder to 
determine; some estimates placed the number in the thousands.86 One source places 
Filipino dead, not including wounded, at 3,000.87 The official American report claimed 
the Filipinos had suffered 700 killed and 3,300 wounded.88 Otis speculated that there had 
been about 500 Filipinos killed and another 500 captured, and while his own casualties 
were light in comparison, they were enough to give him pause, considering how thinly 
stretched his lines were.89 
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PROBLEMS WITHIN THE ARMY OF LIBERATION 
 The Philippine-American War began on the evening of February 4th, 1899.  For 
much of 1899, the war was waged between two standing armies.  By year’s end, 
however, Aguinaldo shifted into a guerrilla war after failing to hold the Americans in 
Manila.  During the conventional phase of the war, Filipino forces struggled to defend 
even strong positions. They could hold the Americans and inflict losses, but American 
soldiers often easily breached positions that should have been formidable.  Before the 
Battle of Manila, Filipinos had worked for months preparing their positions, and all the 
wisdom of the day spoke to the difficulty in taking prepared positions, even those 
defended in small numbers.  As the campaign went on American soldiers and officers 
showed aggression, and even assaults against larger forces often succeeded, typically 
with light casualties.90 
 In fact, Americans soldiers had even recently experienced the potential cost of 
attacking an entrenched enemy. At the battle of San Juan Hill the previous summer, 
Americans had attacked Spanish forces who were dug in and equipped with modern 
rifles. Although the battle was a victory for the Americans they suffered heavy casualties, 
210 killed and 1,180 wounded. The Spanish suffered significantly fewer casualties, 215 
killed, and only 376 wounded. In that battle, they had been attacking a smaller Spanish 
force, less than 2,000 strong.91  
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 At a glance, the differences in the experience of the soldiers does not seem to be 
the answer.  The American troops at this early stage of the campaign mostly consisted of 
state volunteers with mixed levels of training.  Filipino forces consisted of men with 
experience fighting the Spanish, ex-members of Spanish colonial militias, and new 
recruits that by the time of open hostilities had been in the military as long as many of the 
American volunteers.   
 If experience was not the answer, then neither were the arms the two sides carried.  
Later in the war, and especially during the irregular phase of the war, American troops 
consistently used modern bolt action rifles while the Filipinos struggled even to keep 
their troops armed with any rifle.  However, at this point, both sides carried a similar mix 
of small arms. Most of the volunteer units still carried single shot black powder arms.  
Thanks to the modernization efforts of the early 1890s, the Army had adopted a new 
magazine fed, bolt action rifle that used smokeless powder ammunition.  The new Krag-
Jorgensen rifle incorporated features at the forefront of small arms technology of that era.   
However, government arsenals had not built enough of the new rifles yet to equip 
everyone. Regular units carried the new rifles while volunteers carried the older guns, 
only occasionally getting updated replacements.92 
  The weapons of the Filipino forces were as mixed as what the Americans carried. 
Although significant parts of the Filipino forces only had Bolo knives, many carried 
rifles. Until the beginning of the Philippine-American War in February 1899, the 
Filipinos had been able to bring in arms from outside and use what they had captured 
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from the Spanish. When Dewey first arrived he had helped Aguinaldo purchase arms.  
The American Army only began their campaign to deny rifles to Filipino forces later.  
Filipino forces carried Mauser rifles, the most modern design in the world at the time, 
and American-made Remington Rolling Block rifles, another single-shot breechloader 
equivalent to the single-shot Springfield rifle that American volunteers used.  These were 
the same kind of arms that the Spanish troops at San Juan used to inflict heavy losses on 
the American assault.  
 The largest differences in weapons between the two armies were artillery and 
ammunition supply.  The Americans had modern artillery and, in some areas, supportive 
naval gunfire.  Filipino forces had a few field guns, but that was all.  The Filipino 
ammunition supply consisted of imported, captured, or locally produced ammunition.  
Often it was poor quality since it was hard to source the right components.  Still, the 
Army of Liberation possessed modern weapons but failed to inflict heavy casualties.93  
 David Silbey argues that the overall poor performance of Filipinos was in the way 
they recruited and organized their troops.  Deficiencies in training and equipment only 
provide part of the answer.  Silbey points out that the Filipino forces were recruited at a 
local level often at a patron/client type relationship.  Aguinaldo only had loose control 
over many of his commanders and could not enforce Army-wide standards of discipline.  
 During combat, this problem manifested itself as units fighting long enough to fill 
an obligation and then withdrawing, in some cases even before American troops had 





abilities and American forces achieved victories that simply would not have been 
possible against other forces.  Many Filipinos simply viewed war differently than their 
American counterparts.  They filled their obligations by going out and firing at 
Americans until they felt threatened and then retreated, having done the extent of their 
duty.  Limited firing at troops in the distance, combined with poor ammunition and 
training meant that Americans suffered much lighter casualties than an observer might 
have expected.  Once troops fell back, they left gaps in the lines which American troops 
could exploit. 94  
 Silbey's argument does provide an explanation beyond poor weapons or American 
individual soldier superiority.  Withdrawing during combat is a risky undertaking for any 
force, but especially an undertrained one. In the face of a determined enemy it can be 
disastrous, as many of the Filipino defeats were.  Brian Linn war argues along similar 
lines.  He points out that while the weapons, training, and marksmanship all contributed 
to American success, the key factor was overall cohesion. While individual Filipino units 
fought well, they often did not rely on the units alongside them.  This kind of breakdown 
could turn almost any break in the line into a chance for Americans to turn the battle.  
The Battle of Manila demonstrated the otherwise unproven capabilities of the American 
volunteers, while severely damaging Filipino morale.  It also influenced the Americans to 
be highly aggressive throughout the war, even to the point of recklessness.95 
  During the conventional phase of the war, only a handful of actions resulted in 
anything close to significant American casualties.  Most American attacks were one-sided 
																																								 																				
94 Ibid., 72–76. 
95 Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902, 2000, 62–63. 
40	
	
successes. American commanders learned to press the attack and their aggression paid 
off.  They consistently drove the Army of Liberation back.  Constant retreat never 
allowed the Filipinos a chance to institute any reform or spend the time that they needed 
to rest and improve. 
 For their credit, Filipino troops could stand and fight; the problem was which 
units could be counted on to fight and which could not.  U.S. General Henry Lawton 
called the Filipino soldiers "The bravest men I have ever seen."96 Courage alone could 
not make up for the widespread deficiencies in the Army of Liberation.  At least some 
Filipino officers recognized the problems, but trying to reform an army on limited 
resources in the face of an aggressive enemy was always going to be almost impossible, 
and Aguinaldo, though a shrewd politician, performed poorly as a military commander.97 
 During February 1899 Otis sought to maintain his position around Manila.  
Although American troops had been successful in the initial battles, their lines were thin, 
and Otis felt that he needed more manpower to go on the offensive without risking 
Manila.  The Filipinos gave him good reason to worry as well.  The previously discussed 
problems with the Army of Liberation were not entirely evident to the Americans yet, 
and it managed to keep the pressure on the American defenses.  On February 22, 1899, 
they launched an attack on the city's northern suburbs after infiltrating American lines 
with approximately 1,000 men.  The Americans repulsed the attack and inflicted heavy 
casualties on the Filipinos, but it was enough to remind the Americans that their lines 
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were vulnerable.  To counter this threat, the Americans patrolled aggressively to break up 









Otis soon began a two-pronged offensive from his base in Manila.  MacArthur 
was to drive north toward the Filipino capital in Malolos with his division while General 
Anderson drove south with his division.  The colorful Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton 
led Anderson's spearhead. Wheaton was another Civil War veteran.  He had enlisted 
during the war and eventually won the Medal of Honor and a promotion to brevet 
Colonel. Following the war, he reverted to the rank of Captain which he held for 25 
years.  He sought to move down the Pasig River and seize the fertile farmland around the 
lake Laguna de Bay. Wheaton's campaign began on March 12, 1899. His troops advanced 
along the Pasig River with help from the gunboat Laguna de Bay named after the lake 
that was their objective. Wheaton's troops encountered stubborn Filipino resistance, 
holding the Americans for several hours at a time. The Filipinos fought until they were 
threatened with being cut off or until the gunboat arrived with its heavy firepower. 
Despite this resistance, they were unable to stop Wheaton's column. The Americans 
achieved the objective, and along the way, Wheaton implemented a policy reminiscent of 
his former superior, General Sherman. Wheaton ordered the destruction of towns and 
villages along his line of advance, later claiming it was in response to enemy resistance.  
American soldiers burned buildings out to five miles on either side of the road as they 
marched, and as one soldier stated, "The entire district so destroyed so that it would seem 
necessary not only for a bird but even a Filipino to carry his rations while crossing it."99 
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  MacArthur, who had expected heavy resistance, entered Malolos on March 31, 
1899, and found only sporadic resistance in the city. MacArthur's command had suffered 
56 killed and 478 wounded since early March. While these are not insignificant numbers, 
they were not enough to slow down or stop the American advance. Taking Malolos 
proved indecisive as Aguinaldo and the government retreated further. Observers began to 
note the difficulties in fighting the Filipinos, as a correspondent wrote about the 
objective, "[The Filipinos]...took up the goalposts and carried them back."100  
 The Army of Liberation retreated, along with the government, to Calumpit, a few 
miles to the north. MacArthur wanted to continue the advance, but Otis ordered him to 
stop and refit his troops before continuing. The American advance resumed on April 24, 
1899.  To defend the city General Luna dug in his troops behind a river, but even a strong 
natural defense and entrenchments did not stop the American assault.  By April 25, 1899 
the Americans captured Calumpit. American aggression, even against superior numbers 
and prepared positions, proved enough to rout Filipino defenders. As one soldier wrote 
home in early May "The new method of fighting this war is to fire a few rounds - then 
advance towards the enemy - firing as we go. using this tactic, the Filipinos cannot shoot 
at us without exposing themselves - which they seldom do - and they soon leave in a 
hurry."101 
 While troops fought in the Philippines, politicians had yet to ratify the Treaty of 
Paris, which had granted control of the Philippines to the U.S.  Ratification was not a 
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forgone conclusion, but it was an uphill fight for the anti-imperialist faction that stood 
against it. The anti-imperialists argued against annexing the Philippines citing more 
pressing domestic issues, economic problems, and the immorality of forcing American 
institutions at gunpoint onto another people. Imperialists possessed a majority in the 
Senate but needed a two-thirds majority to ratify the treaty. Initially, it seemed that they 
might be short of votes. Their arguments played to patriotism and, rather cynically, to the 
United States' treatment of Native Americans. A vote against ratification was to say that 
America was incapable of overseeing the Philippines. To counter those who said that the 
Filipinos should be granted their self-government imperialists claimed that this same 
freedom had not been given to the Native American tribes at home, so why should they 
grant it to Filipinos? In the end, events dictated the outcome of the debate when the 
fighting started. On February 6, 1899, the Senate voted 57-27 to approve the treaty.102 
 Ratification and the Army's success in the Philippines began to reshape the 
public's image of the military as well. The Dodge Commission released its report on the 
Army's shortcomings in Cuba in February of 1899.  To the American public, the old 
Army had been made up of poor enlisted men and stifled officers. To observers, the new 
Army that fought in the Philippines consisted of energetic volunteers that brought 
civilization to a new western frontier. Along with the Army's successes, McKinley 
requested and approved bills from Congress that expanded the size of the regular army 
and added more volunteer units.103 
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 The capture of Calumpit represented the end of the Manila campaign. The 
campaign had been a complete success for the Americans. For the Filipinos, it had been a 
disaster. The Army of Liberation was unable to stop the Americans or significantly delay 
their advance. These conditions put its leaders in a difficult position. The summer 
monsoon season brought a temporary halt to major campaigning. American units, well 
past their enlistment deadlines, began to go home and be replaced with fresh volunteers 
from the states.  
 Aguinaldo faced a supremely difficult task.  He recognized the need to reorganize 
and rebuild his army, but he had limited resources and time.  He complicated his 
difficulties by trying to consolidate his power and had General Luna executed.  
Aguinaldo's army was fractured, under-equipped, and had poor military leaders.  
Aguinaldo had two options.  He could try and keep the army together and in the field 
against the Americans, or he could order his troops to break up into smaller commands 
and wage guerrilla warfare.  He chose to keep his army together. The Filipinos had been 
successful against the Spanish as guerrilla fighters, and committing to that kind of 
warfare earlier might have yielded better results.  By keeping his army together to fight a 
conventional war, Aguinaldo made both a political and military decision.  The Army of 
Liberation remained as the only real institution of government.  Keeping it in the field 
meant the government still existed.  The army gave disparate groups a rallying point and 
legitimacy as a state, at least in Aguinaldo's eyes.  If he broke up the army, then he risked 
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further fracturing and losing his claim, both to outsiders and his fellow Filipinos, that the 
Philippines were a sovereign state.104 
 On the American side, General Otis looked to the fall as his chance to destroy the 
Army of Liberation and end the war.  The Army had no trouble in finding more 
volunteers after the successes in Cuba and the Philippines and though the Army still 
faced some logistics issues fresh regiments, including three African American units, 
replaced those regiments that had gone home. Otis had around 20,000 American troops at 
his disposal and had begun to recruit Filipino auxiliary units led by American officers to 
free up more troops for frontline duty.  During the spring and summer, the Navy 
instituted a blockade that greatly hindered communication and support between islands, 
and Aguinaldo's forces were limited to the resources they had within the islands.  
 When Otis launched his campaign on October 9, 1899 he split his forces into 
three columns in the face of the Army of Liberation.  The three-pronged attack was 
designed to pin Aguinaldo's forces in place while columns under Wheaton and Lawton 
maneuvered behind the Army of Liberation.  Once in place, the third column under 
MacArthur could drive the Filipinos into these blocking forces.  
 The American plan ran into trouble as heavy rains slowed MacArthur's advance 
and much of the Army of Liberation escaped. Forces under the command of General 
Samuel Young captured a proclamation that stated that Aguinaldo intended to move his 
capital once again, this time into the mountains roughly 75 miles from the American front 
lines.  Young was yet another Civil War veteran.  He had enlisted as a private and risen to 
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the rank of Brigadier General.  Young had fought across the bridge over Antietam Creek 
at the Battle of Antietam and participated in the Plains Wars.  He proposed to pursue and 
capture Aguinaldo ahead of the main American force while living off the land for his 
supplies.105 
 On November 7th, General Young took a mixed unit of 1,000 men and pushed 
ahead in his attempt to capture Aguinaldo.  Away from their supplies, Young's small 
force kept up a close pursuit of Aguinaldo.  In the first seven days, they marched 120 
miles, but Aguinaldo managed to stay ahead of them.  At the village of Pozorrubio on the 
15th, gunfire warned Aguinaldo that Young's men had almost caught up with him, and he 
and his bodyguard left town as the American's fought their way into it.  By this point, 
Young needed reinforcements to continue, which met up with his force in the form of a 
battalion of Texas volunteers.  Aguinaldo had fled into the mountains of Central Luzon 
and left a 60-man rearguard to defend the pass into the mountains behind him.  On 
December 2nd, the Americans reached the chokepoint, and the ensuing day-long Battle of 
Tirad Pass became christened the Filipino Thermopylae.  Sixty Filipinos held the pass 
dug in behind rocks, and their strong position only broke when a small detachment of 
Americans scaled a cliff to fire on the Filipinos from above.  Only eight of the sixty 
Filipinos survived, but the delay proved to be enough.  Within a week, the Americans 
ended their pursuit.  Many in Young's column had marched on without shoes, on reduced 
rations, and sick.  They had reached their limit.106  
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 Aguinaldo managed to escape into relative safety.  Although the Americans failed 
to capture Aguinaldo, they had separated him from his army.  During his flight, on 
December 13th, 1899 Aguinaldo had ordered his army to turn to guerrilla warfare.  He 
had been able to avoid this difficult order since the outbreak of the war.  At one point the 
Army of Liberation stood on the verge of capturing Manilla and possibly completing a 
campaign to gain independence from Spain.  Now a conventional war turned into an 
irregular one.  The Army of Liberation melted into the countryside to wage a different 











CHAPTER 2: IRREGULAR WAR 
By late December 1899, General Otis' fall offensives had drawn to a close and he 
turned to occupying the rest of the archipelago.  The Army of Liberation seemed 
thoroughly beaten, and Otis bragged that he could march a 3,000-man column anywhere 
in the islands and that the insurgents would be powerless to stop him.  This sense of 
impunity, and assurances from Filipino elites in Manila that they wanted annexation, led 
many Americans to believe the war was over.  Even Bell reported that the only remaining 
resistance was "small bands...largely composed of the flotsam and jetsam of the wreck of 
the insurrection."107  
AMERICAN FRUSTRATION 
What remained out of sight for many Americans was the fact that many Filipinos 
had heeded Aguinaldo's December call to begin a guerrilla war.  The remnants of the 
Army of Liberation used their experience waging war against the Spanish and 
transformed into an effective guerrilla army.  Even as Americans like Bell were assuming 
that they only needed to mop up isolated armed resistance, the Filipinos were preparing 
for a different kind of war.  
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In early 1900, the U.S. military government began to shift into a new role as 
administrator over the islands.  The Americans began reorganizing the courts, legal 
codes, and local and regional governments.  In the areas that they controlled, Americans 
also introduced campaigns to improve social conditions.  Americans began widespread 
public health and education campaigns, as they had done when they first occupied 
Manila.108  In all of this, the goal was to show Filipinos the benefits of U.S. rule and 
convince them of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines.  Ultimately 
American officials believed that the war had been won and that they could look to a 
transition from a military government to a civilian one.109 
For those Filipinos that remained in the field, the Americans introduced other 
incentives. One of the key components of continued resistance to the American 
occupation was weapons.  It may seem like an obvious statement, but the Filipinos were 
short on firearms from the outset. The Americans recognized this weakness and actively 
tried to exploit it.  In late 1899 they had introduced a bounty on any rifle that was handed 
over.  Between November 1899 and April 1900, the bounty netted over 1,000 firearms in 
Luzon.  James Bell during his command of the 36th United States Volunteer Infantry 
Regiment, one of those units recruited from ex-state volunteers, considered it a success 
that his unit had captured 775 rifles over the course of seven months.110  In just a few 
months the bounty was more effective than Bell's regiment in the field had been for the 
better part of a year.  The financial incentive was enough to get many Filipinos to 
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surrender.  One insurgent officer wrote that his whole command would surrender for the 
bounty if they knew that they would not be imprisoned.111 
While the Americans busied themselves with occupation and administration, 
Filipino commanders began to adapt to fighting a guerrilla war.  Although the Army of 
Liberation had been broken up, significant numbers of Filipinos remained ready to 
continue the war against the Americans.  An insurgent commander laid out the plan to 
fight back against the Americans.  He ordered his men to "Annoy the enemy at different 
points...our aim is not to vanquish them, a difficult matter considering their superiority in 
numbers and arms, but to inflict on them constant losses, to the end of discouraging them 
and convincing them of our rights."112 
Aguinaldo nominally ran the insurgency from his headquarters in Northern 
Luzon.  The islands were divided into districts with a commanding general and sub-
districts led by colonels and majors.  The fighting men of the insurgency comprised two 
main groups, former soldiers from the Army of Liberation operating as insurgents full-
time and a part-time militia.  This structure depended on the ability of local commanders.  
Throughout the insurgency, however, Aguinaldo struggled to maintain control from his 
remote hideout in the mountains of Northern Luzon.  Actual responsibility for waging the 
war fell to subordinates operating almost with near complete independence.  Aguinaldo 
still represented a significant figure, but could do little to influence his commanders.  The 
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local district commanders often commanded only a few hundred men in a given province 
that were divided up into smaller bands.113  
These bands of regulars consisted of the men that had been in the Army of 
Liberation.  They often operated in groups of fewer than 50 and were supposed to be the 
best equipped. However, the Filipinos were still under-armed for the war.  The U.S. 
blockade of the islands prevented any outside shipments of weapons from reaching the 
insurgents. They relied on a limited amount of homemade ammunition which prevented 
adequate practice and frequently misfired.  After one engagement, an American officer 
concluded that 60 percent of the rounds fired at his men had misfired.  The rounds that 
did fire often missed due to the condition of the weapons and a lack of training.  The 
insurgent officer knew their limitations and tried to overcome them by using carefully 
prepared ambushes to engage the Americans and preserving their strength by quickly 
withdrawing after a few volleys.  These tactics enabled them to maintain their manpower 
and frustrate the American soldiers.114 
The part-time militia that made up the rest of the Filipino army maintained the 
network that kept the regulars in the field.  They provided the regulars with supplies, 
intelligence, and shelter.   These bolomen, known for the knives they carried, acted as the 
local police for the Filipino shadow government.  They collected taxes, enforced the 
rules, gathered intelligence, and protected local officials.  To gain civilian support the 
insurgents appealed to nationalism, ethnic and religious loyalties, and coercion.  Civilians 
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that aided the Americans or did not support the insurgency were subject to fines, beating, 
property destruction, or even death.115 
As the Filipinos laid the groundwork for their guerrilla strategy, the Americans 
began to implement their policy of attraction.  During the first half of 1900, the 
Americans assumed that the Filipinos had peacefully accepted their defeat and were at 
least tolerant of American rule.  This assumption was out of touch and hampered by poor 
intelligence.  Regardless, the Americans began a campaign to provide vaccinations, jobs, 
and schools.  The program relied on low-level officers in charge of individual garrisons 
to administer local government and aid to Filipino citizens.  It was the fulfillment of 
America’s plan for benevolent assimilation.  Americans saw that it was their duty to aid a 
society that was incapable of self-rule.  In many regions, American efforts at this kind of 
governance succeeded.  A local garrison, stability, and improvements to the local society 
garnered loyalty from civilian populations that had already suffered enough fighting, or 
that had not been particularly loyal to the revolution in the first place.  Success in these 
more peaceful areas even contributed to hiding the growth of the insurgency in others, as 
both Otis and his replacement, MacArthur, thought the insurgents to be on their last legs 
during the winter of 1899-1900.  MacArthur considered his offer of amnesty in June of 
1900 to be a gesture to end the war and attract the final holdouts of the insurgency to 
surrender.116 
Even as these programs began, the fighting continued.  Insurgents raided 
communication lines, supply columns, and even led one American General to write that 
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defeat might be at hand.   In addition, the insurgents continued to intimidate civilians and 
in just 1900 alone the Americans recorded over 300 assassinations and over 400 assaults.  
By April 1900, Bell had changed his tone from comparing the insurgency to flotsam. He 
reported that his command in Southern Luzon was unable to control more than a few 
towns, and could not control the surrounding territory.117 Even with an apparent defeat of 
Aguinaldo's standing army and the bulk of the U.S. Army garrisoning the Philippines, the 
Americans could not provide enough security to end the war that they had assumed to be 
won.118 
Initially, during the rush to enlist at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, 
the U.S. Army struggled to cope with the rapid expansion. The army struggled to equip, 
train and move, both its regular and volunteer units during initial war with Spain.  By the 
time that Aguinaldo disbanded the Filipino Revolutionary Army in December of 1899, 
the U.S. Army had largely overcome these problems.  New regulars and volunteers alike 
received better training.  Many of the units now had combat experience from the previous 
year's fighting.  When state volunteer regiments returned home, many men signed on 
with new United States Volunteer regiments. Many of the initial volunteers that fought in 
the Philippines had been from Western states.119 They had performed well and frequently 
re-enlisted with new units.  The volunteer regiments that formed had large numbers of 
experienced soldiers in addition to new recruits.120 
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 The senior officers of the army possessed experience that dated back to the Civil 
War. While their combat experience may have seemed dated, they had firsthand 
knowledge of the March to the Sea or Sheridan's Valley Campaign, along with 
campaigns to pacify the Native American tribes living in the American West.  Out of 
thirty American Generals that served in the Philippines, twenty-six participated in the 
Indian Wars.  Among the four that had not, Frederick Funston had volunteered with the 
Cuban revolutionaries fighting against Spain.121  The lower ranking officers that had 
spent years with little to no prospects for advancement had learned to be comfortable 
commanding small unit actions and remote garrisons in the American West.  This 
experience from the Civil War to the Western Frontier had helped to develop a method of 
waging counter-insurgency warfare within the army. Commanders used tactics that 
would later see widespread use in the Philippines, including population control, 
destruction of property and resources, and retaliation for continued resistance. While the 
Army struggled to respond to the initial declaration of war, it was well equipped for the 
coming guerrilla war.122 
Although violence increased in the islands in the spring and summer of 1900, it is 
important to remember that during this period the war remained highly localized.  While 
the Filipino Army was still together American efforts centered on its destruction, but 
even as Aguinaldo spread his men through the provinces to fight back, many areas 
remained peaceful.  In thirty-four of the seventy-seven provinces in the Philippines no 
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fighting took place.  Despite almost half of the islands seeing no fighting, the upcoming 
pacification campaign required a commitment of most of the army's resources.123 
By October of 1900, there were 70,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in the Philippines.  
This was at a time when the authorized strength of the regular army was still under 
100,000 men.  To combat the insurgency and establish a civil government they were 
stationed in over 400 different garrisons.  Even if they could concentrate in each one, 
there would be fewer than 200 men per garrison to fight the insurgency and carry out 
civil rule.  The numbers were often much smaller than that.  The garrisons required 
constant resupply that relied on poor or no infrastructure and the re-supply columns made 
ideal targets for insurgent ambushes.124 
The troops not engaged in supply and civil administration tried to combat the 
insurgency by launching patrols into the countryside.  They made use of mounted 
infantry and cavalry when they could, or carried a light load when they could not.  Bell's 
command marched with just 150 rounds of ammunition, rifle, canteen, cup, half a mess 
kit, utensils, first aid kit, towel, and a poncho or shelter half.  His infantry regiment, 
which he claimed was never up to its authorized 1,000-man strength, made use of up to 
150 horses for communication and chasing down insurgents, in addition to its pack train 
for supply and any horses privately owned by officers and men.125  
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These patrols often faced difficult terrain, but their greatest obstacle was poor 
intelligence.  During the initial year of the guerrilla war, the insurgent intelligence 
network was still strong, and the U.S. often did not have the trust or control of the civilian 
population to prevent them from warning insurgents.  American officers aggressively 
pressed any engagement because opportunities to fight the insurgents were limited and 
they did not have a high regard for the insurgent's skill in a prolonged firefight.126  
Aggressive American tactics did not always win the day.  A company of the 15th 
Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain David Mitchell launched an assault on 
the town of Matibac in Southern Luzon in order to eliminate an insurgent stronghold 
there, and capture insurgent General Juan Cailles.  As many as 800 insurgents 
outnumbered Mitchell's 130-man company, but he continued with the attack regardless.  
American soldiers had to approach the town over a long causeway flanked by flooded 
ground on either side.  While Mitchell led part of his company up the causeway, another 
part of the company moved into a flanking position and attacked from a second direction.  
Flooded terrain delayed the flanking party, and the insurgents concentrated their fire on 
Mitchell and the men he led down the causeway. Despite their poor equipment, the 
insurgents found the Americans to be easy targets, and Mitchell's men found themselves 
caught in a crossfire and retreated. 
Mitchell's headlong attack led to 23 Americans killed and 19 more wounded.  
Mitchell was among the dead, and while MacArthur praised the soldier's courage 
publicly, he confided that if Mitchell had survived, he would have ordered him court-
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martialed.  To deepen the injury, the American forces that returned the following day 
found no Filipino fighters.  The insurgents had melted into surrounding towns and 
villages as civilians.  Mitchell's attack was foolish, but it came from a widespread desire 
to simply engage the enemy.  The opportunity to bring insurgents to battle at Matibac 
outweighed the tactical disadvantage that the Americans faced there.  This style of 
combat which frustrated the Americans earned the name "Amigo Warfare" among 
officers and soldiers.  Insurgents could be beaten or driven off, and then later blend in 
with the civilian population, their arms hidden until the next opportunity to fight.  Many 
American soldiers failed to distinguish the civilian population from the insurgents, and 
the insurgents used this advantage as much as they could.127 
American troops in the Philippines often exacerbated their tense relationship with 
the civilian population.  They commonly drank which often led to fights. Soldiers would 
take food or other supplies from villagers, and at the end of the spectrum, they would 
retaliate violently against nearby civilian populations when a comrade was killed.  Many 
Filipino civilians were simply caught between the two sides.  The people that lived life 
between the soldiers and insurgents had to cope as best as they could.   In most towns, it 
led to the population supporting the Americans by day and the insurgents by night, they 
had to try and appease both sides while risking the wrath of each.128  
Drinking and fighting were not the only clashes between the two cultures.  From 
the beginning of the war, reports alleged American atrocities against Filipinos.  
Describing the Battle of Manila, a soldier had written home that his Washington regiment 
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had killed more than 1,000 Filipinos, including women and children, and that they had 
burned down all their houses.  He went on to allege that the Tennessee regiment nearby 
refused to take any prisoners.  Another sergeant wrote that whenever they found a 
wounded insurgent that he and his men resorted to bayonets to kill them.  Allegations 
quickly arose from a private in Frederick Funston's Kansas regiment that officers had 
ordered to kill prisoners and that the man had been ordered by his colonel to shoot four 
prisoners.  Later the allegations grew that Funston used his rank and position to prevent a 
fair investigation.129   
It is difficult to corroborate the soldier's claim of 1,000 killed, especially 
considering that total number of Filipino dead for the entire Battle of Manila was likely 
less than 1,000.  How often American soldiers killed prisoners or noncombatants is 
unclear.  The allegations kept appearing, often in American newspapers as letters from 
soldiers, but official charges or trials rarely followed.  A later study claimed that there 
were 57 incidents during the Philippine-American War which met a legal definition of 
atrocity.130  In addition to defined atrocities, casualty reports often returned high numbers 
of Filipino dead, often several times greater than the number of wounded, unusual for any 
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conflict.  The statistic suggests a willingness on soldiers' part to carry out "no prisoners" 
orders.131 
The problem may have been more extensive, as Bell and other officers claimed 
that although they issued orders against these acts, they had little ability to stop them 
outside of their immediate presence.  An officer named Henry Allen wrote,  
"You, as well as I, know that in bringing to a successful issue war 
measures out here certain things will take place not intended by the higher 
authorities; that the 'water cure' and other unauthorized methods will be 
resorted to in spite of the strictest instructions.  I have heard that under me, 
although against my orders, the 'water cure' and other measures just as 
bad, or worse, were adopted, and probably under you the same; moreover, 
it can be said that such things have taken place under all commanders out 
here."132  
The torture method known as the "water cure" that Allen wrote about was widely 
used by the Americans to interrogate prisoners.  The actual method was described by an 
American soldier as follows.  
 "A man is thrown down on his back and three or four men sit or 
stand on his arms and legs and hold him down;...a carbine barrel or a stick 
as big as a belaying pin, and, if possible, a wooden log or stone is put 
under his head or neck, so he can be held more firmly. In the case of very 
old men I have seen their teeth fall out, -- and I mean when it was done a 
little roughly.  He is simply held down and then water is poured onto his 
face down his throat and nose from a jar, and that is kept up until the man 
gives some sign or becomes unconscious.  And then...he is simply...rolled 
aside rudely, so that water is expelled. A man suffers tremendously, there 
is no doubt about it."133  
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Allegations of torture and atrocities stirred anti-imperialist voices in the United 
States. 1900 was a U.S. presidential election year, and the Democrat candidate William 
Jennings Bryan campaigned on anti-imperialism.  Aguinaldo, keenly aware of this, knew 
that it was his best time to impact American policy.  He ordered his forces to increase 
their attacks on American outposts to try and inflict losses that would hurt McKinley’s 
chance of re-election.  Aguinaldo's plan was likely his best opportunity to impact the U.S. 
occupation significantly, but it also meant that McKinley's re-election became a severe 
blow to the Filipino cause.134 
 While Aguinaldo was aware of the election season, he overestimated the chance 
of McKinley losing the election.  Aguinaldo also underestimated the American response 
to increased insurgent activity.  McKinley’s opponent William Jennings Bryan had lost 
an election bid four years before, and his main platform had been about economics 
centered on his "Free Silver" policy.  His campaign now faced an incumbent president 
who had overseen a successful war against Spain and a better economy than during the 
last election.  Bryan faced an uphill battle to win the election, and his main chance to 
stand out from McKinley was his opposition to annexing the Philippines.  
Unfortunately for Bryan, this position failed to resonate with many Americans.  
Anti-imperialists in the U.S. protested the war, but they never held a majority position.  
Aguinaldo had little opportunity to gain an accurate appraisal of the U.S. political 
climate.  His campaign to increase publicized attacks failed to achieve a meaningful 
impact.  Reporters tried to write on the increased attacks but the American military began 
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strict censorship policies to ensure that word of any American losses stayed in the 
Philippines.  Army censors delayed reports, prohibited the use of the word "ambush," and 
inflated their successes.  One report cited that the army had captured 800 insurgents and 
their firearms. When a reporter investigated further, he found that only 40 rifles had been 
captured, and the Army added in any other weapons they found to the count. 135 
 As 1900 wore on the insurgents saw some hope for their campaign, but with 
McKinley’s victory, a positive outcome became impossible. The Americans had been 
able to defeat the revolutionary army in battle, but not end the insurgency. Despite an 
ongoing adherence to "benevolent assimilation" and its building programs, new roads, 
schools, public health campaign, and civil administration, the American campaign was 
far from over.  It still could not prevent widespread insurgent support or attacks. Even if 
these attacks could not end the American occupation, they prevented full American rule.  
 To implement American governance of the islands, McKinley dispatched the 
Philippine Commission under future President William Taft. When Taft arrived in June at 
the head of the commission, his purpose was to provide the Filipinos with an effective 
civilian government. Initially, the commission assumed legislative power in the islands. 
As the military declared provinces to be "pacified" they would be handed over to the 
authority of the commission until the entirety of the Philippines was under civilian 
governance and Taft would become governor of the territory. 136  
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 In the meantime, Taft repeatedly clashed with the military and General Arthur 
MacArthur, now head of the army in the Philippines.  Each side resented sharing 
authority with the other and had different views on how to end the war.  Taft’s optimistic 
outlook on the conflict and paternal view of the Philippines also stood against the way 
that many American soldiers viewed Filipinos. After Taft had referred to Filipinos as 
“Our little brown brother” soldiers created new lyrics for a then popular tune to explain 
their feelings.   
“I’m only a common soldier man in the blasted Philippines, They 
say I got Brown Brothers here, but I dunno what it means.  I like the word 
Fraternity, but I still draw the line; He may be a brother of William H. 
Taft, but he ain’t no friend of mine.”137 
This soldierly view of the Filipinos echoed sentiments of American officers as 
well. From top to bottom, the American military in the Philippines did not trust the new 
civilian administration to get the job done and viewed most of the population with 
mistrust or as outright collaborators with the insurgency. 
INSURGENCY REVEALED 
As the insurgents carried out more direct attacks on American troops and outposts 
during their election season offensive, Americans began to realize that they needed to 
change their approach.  MacArthur himself suspected that the majority of Filipinos were 
loyal to the insurgency.  Much of the insurgent support relied on intimidation or force.  
Filipinos who were willing to stop supporting the insurgency and provide their loyalty to 
the Americans needed protection.  If Americans could not provide some measure of 
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security and support to those loyal to their cause, they would never be able to end the 
war. Taft concluded after his initial tour of the islands that most civilians wanted peace 
but feared reprisals.  
Taft’s view differed from MacArthur, who still assumed that civilians would 
provide spoken loyalty to the Americans and get the benefits that their loyalty entailed, 
while still maintaining active support for the insurgency.  The reasons that American 
officials and officers could look at the Philippines and come away with such different 
conclusions was due in part to the regional differences in the provinces, but much more 
important, until the summer of 1900, few on the American side had a clear understanding 
of how the insurgency operated.  
That changed in June 1900 when Lieutenant William Johnston sent a report to 
MacArthur titled “Methods Adopted by Insurgents for Organizing and Maintaining a 
Guerrilla Force.” This report contained the information from several months of 
investigation and work by Johnston in the province of La Union. La Union was located in 
Northwestern Luzon 170 miles from Manila.  Johnston suspected more to the insurgency 
than a few local bands and that they needed support to stay in the field.  He began a 
thorough investigation and soon started to learn about the shadow government operating 
in areas previously thought pacified.  Johnston used a local cult leader that had strained 
ties to the insurgency to begin naming figures in the resistance.  Johnston first used his 
informant to uncover insurgent officers and stockpiles in the town of Bauang.  The 
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network he had started to uncover showed Johnston that the insurgent government had 
been operating within American controlled areas with relative impunity.138  
Johnston learned that insurgents had infiltrated many levels of civil government 
even in those towns that had significant numbers of American troops.  He also found out 
that they gained supplies and taxes from the local population and by skimming from 
American aid.  His intelligence showed that insurgent bands often camped by local 
towns, even those with American garrisons to enforce the authority of this shadow 
government and that even high-ranking insurgent leaders could move in and out of 
American-controlled areas.  In La Union, this information was both a shock and finally a 
means to combat the insurgency effectively.  Johnston used the original cult-leader-
turned-counterinsurgent to recruit a Filipino volunteer force, which consisted initially of 
mostly his cult followers, to begin naming and arresting suspected insurgents.139  
Those arrested could prove their loyalty to the Americans by turning over more 
information or former comrades, which provided more intelligence to the Americans and 
guaranteed that the prisoner could not rejoin the insurgency.  The Americans appointed 
loyal Filipinos to the important civil positions and regained control in towns that had 
previously served as safe havens for the shadow government.  In the course of a few 
months, the province had been declared pacified. MacArthur received the report in June 
and made the decision that American strategy needed to change.  He also recognized that 
a public acknowledgment of the American failure to finish a war that had seemed to be 
won a few months before would give fodder to rising anti-imperial sentiment back home. 
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MacArthur knew that he needed to wait until after the election to enact the harsh measure 
he now thought necessary to end the war. Anti-imperialist voices back home faced strong 
opposition from those that supported the war, annexation, and McKinley.  They were 
labeled unpatriotic and accused of aiding the insurgency.  The New York Tribune even 
attacked William Jennings Bryan by saying that “Every American soldier killed during 
these months can be laid directly at his door.”140  
Following McKinley’s victory in the 1900 election, MacArthur began to 
implement a new strategy in the Philippines.  This new effort, based on Lt. Johnston’s 
work, represented a major shift from a “policy of attraction”141 that had been the overall 
American strategy until this point. MacArthur’s strategy took a hard turn.  He outlined 
that static garrisons would continue to protect important towns, but additional more 
mobile forces were to be assigned to conduct sweeps of insurgent territory to root out the 
bands still fighting the Americans.  Also, the Americans began to recruit more native 
auxiliaries to supplement their manpower.  This new push began in December, after the 
election, but this reorganization of American efforts represented only part of the change 
that MacArthur implemented in the fall of 1900.142 
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The legal basis for MacArthur’s shift was the Lieber Code, also known as General 
Orders 100.143  Since the beginning of the war American forces had been operating under 
this standing order which dated to U.S. Civil War.  While official American policy during 
the Philippine-American War had been "Benevolent Assimilation", the Army had been 
operating under G.O. 100. The dichotomy between official policy and local enforcement 
created a situation where commanders operated under their interpretation of the order, 
and how to make it fit with the broader policy of attraction.  In practice, many 
commanders resorted to the punitive sections of G.O. 100 to combat the insurgents, while 
the American command in Manila officially practiced attraction.  In late December, 
MacArthur issued a proclamation to the Philippine people and his men that the 
Americans were now using the full measure of the G.O. 100. This shift bridged the gap 
between official and de facto policy and made it clear that anyone who still opposed the 
Americans faced intense repercussions.144 
A lawyer named Frances Lieber wrote General Orders 100 during the Civil War 
in 1863. Lieber’s code became the first documented “laws of war.”  The document was 
meant to be a standing order that governed the Union Army and laid out standards of 
conduct for both combatants and noncombatants.  When Lieber wrote G.O.100 the 
hostile territory and enemy combatants were the Confederates in the American South, 
now the hostile forces were the Filipino insurgents. G.O. 100 especially focused on the 
treatment of anyone operating as a guerrilla and their supporters.  The punishment for this 
kind of warfare could be stringent, including summary executions, and Lieber made clear 
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that guerrillas were not to be treated as enemy soldiers.  Anyone that aided guerrillas 
could have their property destroyed.  MacArthur released the proclamation to give notice 
that remaining insurgents were in violation of the laws of war as written in General Order 
100.  He had offered an amnesty during the summer that had failed to net any major 
leaders of the insurgency, and he sought to use G.O. 100 as the harsh alternative.145 
Some American officers had already used General Order 100 as justification for 
harsh policies.  American forces resorted to burning crops and homes, arresting suspected 
insurgents, or even shooting suspected saboteurs on sight.  For those officers that had 
been employing these tactics, the announcement came as a tacit acceptance that they had 
been right.  For others, it came as the signal to begin waging a hard war on the insurgents, 
some of whom had believed that once the war was over their lives could return to normal 
with their status or property unharmed.  Ultimately the goal of the new policy was not 
just to bring destruction to the Philippines for resisting the Americans, but to separate the 
active insurgents from any base of support, and to force those Filipinos in the middle to 
actively pledge their loyalty to the Americans.  By implementing stern measures, 
MacArthur hoped to make the consequences of continued resistance too great.  Lieber's 
stated goal of General Orders 100 was to achieve peace.  To bring peace MacArthur 
decided to destroy the insurgent's support network, not just to convince the population of 
America’s ability to govern the Philippines, as had been the main object of the policy of 
attraction. 146 
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The beginning of 1901 saw the full force of this new strategy begin to have an 
impact on the islands.  MacArthur centered his efforts and his 70,000 troops on the main 
island of Luzon.  He assumed that bringing an end to the insurgency on the largest island 
would have a domino effect on the rest.  Along with more aggressive soldiering, the new 
year saw the rise of the Filipino Federalist Party.  The Federalist Party formed from 
Filipino elites that had decided that the way forward was to recognize American 
sovereignty in the Philippines.  They began a campaign to persuade fellow Filipinos to 
their cause and offered an alternative means of political representation for those outside 
of the Aguinaldo's government.  Their belief that the U.S. had won was both pragmatic, 
as they recognized the fact that anyone who continued to resist would be kept out of the 
postwar government, and patriotic as they still believed in a potential political 
independence for the Philippines.147 
 Throughout the beginning of the new year of 1901 support for the insurgents 
began to erode.  MacArthur's efforts, American reinforcements, and Mckinley's election 
combined to wear down the insurgents.  Between December 1900 and July 1901, 
resistance ended in twenty-one of the thirty-eight provinces that still held out against the 
Americans.  Where efforts before had failed to bring in insurgent leaders, they too began 
to capitulate.  To drive home the point and to signal the end of the war was close at hand 
the Army launched a raid to capture Aguinaldo.148  
 Aguinaldo had been in hiding since the defeat of the Revolutionary Army and his 
decision to transition to guerrilla warfare.  He tried to manage the insurgency from a 
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hidden headquarters in the mountains of northern Luzon.  However, he could only 
manage to exercise limited command and control of his forces through written 
communications to subordinates and proclamation to the Filipino people.  With 
communications already difficult for insurgents, Aguinaldo’s influence over his 
commanders waned.  The conflict became much more regionally focused once the 
Filipinos began their guerrilla campaign, yet Aguinaldo was still an important symbol for 
Filipinos who still believed they could win independence.  
 His capture began with a courier.  In January of 1901, an insurgent messenger 
asked a mayor that had been part of the shadow government for safe passage past the 
Americans.  Unfortunately for the messenger and the insurgency, the mayor was now 
loyal to the Americans.  With the mayor’s help, American forces captured the messenger 
who was carrying about twenty letters.  Among the letters was a request from Aguinaldo 
to his cousin that asked for reinforcements to bolster his headquarters in Palanan.  The 
location was the final piece the Americans needed to strike, and Aguinaldo's need for 
reinforcements provided the means.  With this information, American Brigadier General 
Fred Funston formulated a plan to capture the insurgent leader.149 
 Funston had won the Medal of Honor two years before, when, during the Battle of 
Calumpit he led twenty-two volunteers from his Kansas regiment to take an enemy 
position by crossing a river under fire.150  His plan to capture Aguinaldo needed all of his 
bravery.  Funston, along with four other American officers, were to be led as “prisoners” 
by 80 Macabebe Scouts dressed and armed as insurgents.  A gunboat deposited them 
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within insurgent territory and they proceeded to march 100 miles to Aguinaldo’s 
headquarters.  To aid in their raid, Funston forged two letters on captured insurgent paper 
that appeared to have been written by a Filipino commander that Aguinaldo trusted.  
During the march, Funston relied on several ex-insurgents to lead the way and help fool 
any actual insurgents they came across.  When Funston’s force arrived, the ruse worked.  
Aguinaldo turned out his honor guard to greet them.  The Macabebes formed up opposite 
the honor guard and instead of firing a salute opened fire on the guards.  As the volley 
erupted, one of the ex-insurgent officers ran to capture Aguinaldo, shooting two more of 
his guards in the process.  Among MacArthur’s staff some officers thought the raid 
would end in disaster, but instead, it was a complete success.  Funston had captured 
Aguinaldo and made the rendezvous with the gunboat to return to MacArthur’s 
headquarters.151  
 Aguinaldo’s capture did not end the war, but it did cause some important guerrilla 
leaders to surrender along with some of their men.  Aguinaldo’s capture represented a 
definite success for the Americans in an often-frustrating war without tangible victories. 
For many insurgents though, Aguinaldo was too remote of a symbol for them to give up 
the fight.  They had been loyal to their local commanders before his capture and 
continued to be.  If the local commanders fought on then so did their men.  The 
conclusion of the war fell to MacArthur’s successor, Adna Chaffee.152 
  
																																								 																				
151 Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire, 2008, 175–77. 




CHAPTER THREE: HARD WAR 
When Chaffee assumed command in July of 1901, he wanted to begin a more 
thorough transfer of power to the Philippine Commission.  Initially, he maintained the 
policies that had been successful under MacArthur.  However, Chaffee felt that the Army 
still occupied too many areas and that his troops needed to be released from pacification 
to be better used in fighting the remaining hotspots of the insurgency.  Two insurgent 
strongholds remained, in the province of Batangas and on the island of Samar.  Although 
the change in tactics brought about by MacArthur had been withering for the Filipinos, 
several strong groups of insurgents, including those on Samar and in Batangas, still held 
out against American rule.153 
Chaffee had joined the Army at the outbreak of the Civil War as a private.  By 
1864 he was a Second Lieutenant as part of General Sheridan’s command. Sheridan’s 
campaign through the Shenandoah Valley that year targeted both the Confederate Army 
and the supplies that they used.  Union forces undertook a campaign to destroy anything 
that could be of use to their enemies to try and speed up the end of the war.  Chaffee was 
familiar with hard war and his mandate to defeat the insurgency had a similar basis.  He 
allowed his commanders to use the harshest measures mandated under G.O. 100 to end 
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the war as soon as possible and James Franklin Bell would be one of the top picks to 
implement Chaffee's strategy.154  
	
As Chaffee took over in the late summer of 1901, the Philippine-American War 
looked to be finally nearing an end. MacArthur’s tenure in the islands saw a major 
intelligence breakthrough and widespread dismantling of the insurgency.  The years of 
war had shaped the American Army into an effective counter-insurgency force.  
Although at times thrust into roles and missions that it had not anticipated, the Army had 
adapted well to this method of war.  For James Franklin Bell this war had been a chance 
to finally advance in rank, and he had proven to be an excellent officer.  His tenure in the 
Philippines had led to a rise to the rank of Brigadier General.  He had fought the 
insurgency all over the islands and at nearly every level of command.  His knowledge of 
counter-insurgency warfare, built on U.S. Army history, doctrine, and his experience in 
the Philippines would be vital to the success of his coming campaign in Batangas 
province. 
The event that precipitated Bell's assignment occurred on September 27th, 1901.  
Filipino insurgents infiltrated the town of Balangiga on the Island of Samar and surprised 
the American garrison in an early morning attack.  The residents of the town aided the 
insurgents who were only armed with knives that they had smuggled into Balangiga 
leading up to the assault. Tensions in Balangiga had been high recently between the 
soldiers and Filipinos.  The new garrison commander, Captain Thomas Connell, had 





to clear underbrush and debris from the town.  In addition to these tensions, the island 
was in the middle of the Cholera outbreak.  This outbreak provided cover for the 
insurgents to smuggle knives into the town.  
The night before the attack American sentries noticed residents carrying an 
unusual number of caskets into the church.  When they checked, the Filipinos told the 
Americans that the caskets contained recent Cholera victims.  The excuse, combined with 
Connell’s recent warnings against aggravating the already high tensions was enough for 
the American sentries to allow the “funeral” to continue.155  
The unit assigned to garrison Balangiga was Company C of the 9th U.S. Infantry 
Regiment.  Company C had previously fought in the Philippines and then in the Boxer 
Rebellion in China before its assignment to garrison Balangiga.  On the morning of 
September 27, 1901, most men of this veteran unit were eating breakfast when the town’s 
police chief shot the armed sentry with his own rifle; the remaining soldiers were 
unarmed.  After killing the sentry, insurgents rang the church bell to signal the all out 
attack on the American garrison.156  
Although the Filipinos attacked only with knives and bolos, they had the element 
of surprise.  Since many of the American soldiers were away from their rifles, the 
fighting was hand to hand combat, with the Americans at a decided disadvantage.  
American soldiers fought back with whatever they had available, including rocks and 
reportedly even a baseball bat, but they had to fight their way to their rifles.  The 
Filipinos knew that to capitalize on the surprise, they needed to prevent the Americans 
																																								 																				
155 Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 200–202. 
156 Ibid., 202–3. 
75	
	
from getting to their guns and detailed part of their attacking force to make sure of that.  
Despite this, some soldiers did manage to make it to their guns and organize a fighting 
retreat down to the shoreline.  From there the survivors kept the Filipinos at bay while 
they managed to get onto boats and make an escape.157  
 The Filipinos inflicted forty-eight deaths on the American garrison and probably 
lost between twenty-five and thirty of their men.  To the American Army in the 
Philippines, the attack was a complete shock.  For many Americans, in the summer of 
1901, the war seemed nearly won.  Efforts under MacArthur and Chaffee appeared to 
have broken up the insurgent shadow government and forced the bands of insurgents that 
were left to be always on the run, barely able to feed themselves, much less organize a 
major attack against an American outpost.  
Officials and soldiers quickly dubbed the attack the Balangiga Massacre.  
Although the battle had been one-sided and had the galvanizing impact of a massacre to 
the Americans, in reality, it was a well-organized insurgent assault planned to overcome 
the American advantage in firepower.  Unfortunately for the residents of Samar, the 
distinction between battle and massacre was lost on the U.S. Army and the American 
public.  In newspapers back in America the attack was compared with Custer’s Last 
Stand and labeled as treachery on the part of the Filipinos. Specific reprisal for the assault 
at Balingiga was swift and decisive.  An infantry company that included six of the 
survivors returned to the town aboard a navy gunboat.  When they arrived, they razed 
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Balingiga.  Their commander sent a matter of fact message back to Chaffee, “Buried 
dead, burned town, returned Basey.”158 
The shock of Balangiga caused a panic at the American headquarters in Manila. 
American intelligence began reporting that the insurgents were preparing a new round of 
uprisings for the beginning of 1902 just as they had during the American election season 
of 1900.  These Army intelligence reports and the attack at Balangiga stood in stark 
contrast with the reports from Taft and the Philippine Commission that the insurgents 
were nearly beaten. Chaffee sided with his intelligence service.  To him, the war should 
have been over by now, and the attack was a reminder that American policies had failed 
so far to end the war.  Chaffee reorganized the existing districts into brigade commands 
and looked for officers to bring the war to a close.159     
In reality, Taft’s assessment was correct, and the insurgency was close to being 
defeated.  While some insurgent bands remained in the field and tried to continue the 
war, they had been doing so on ever shrinking resources.  The attack at Balangiga did not 
signal a revival of the insurgency.  Unlike the increased attacks during the summer of 
1900, this well-planned and executed attack marked the maximum effort that the 
Filipinos could muster at this late stage of the war.  The Balangiga Massacre was a last 
gasp for the Filipinos, and it happened on Samar which was home to some of the last 
holdouts of the insurgency.  The shock of the attack resonated because Samar had earned 
a reputation as a particularly challenging area for the Americans to subdue, and because 
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the assault was the worst loss in a single engagement for the Americans in the entire 
war.160  
Chaffee had been in command since July and was familiar with hard war 
campaigns.  He was a Civil War veteran that had fought in General Sheridan's 
Shenandoah Valley Campaign, and the Plains Wars.  The attack on Balangiga led him to 
authorize extreme measures to bring the war to an end.  He had already recognized that 
Batangas province, which Bell would command, was still hostile to American rule.  To 
defeat the insurgency on Samar, Chaffee picked General Jacob Smith.  The campaigns 
that Smith and Bell would wage had a new urgency following Balangiga.  The extreme 
measures that Chaffee authorized later led to a Senate inquiry that would bring 
widespread negative publicity to the two campaigns and damaged the army’s 
reputation.161 
Jacob Smith was another Civil War veteran.  He had been wounded at the Battle 
of Shiloh, and the bullet remained in his hip for the rest of his life.  He had damaged his 
career through misconduct.  Smith had improperly used recruiting bounties during the 
Civil War and in the post-war Army, he had been subject to a court-martial which 
eventually led to his conviction and sacking.  Grover Cleveland saved his career, and 
when war broke out with Spain, Smith received orders to Cuba.  He suffered a bullet 
wound at the Battle of El Caney and following his recovery he transferred to the 
Philippines. 
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 It was in the Philippines that he earned his promotion to a Brigadier General as 
the Philippines proved to be an opportunity for long withheld advancement.  In light of 
the Balangiga attack, Chaffee encouraged a harsh prosecution of the war in the hope that 
it would bring about a quicker end.  Whatever degree of harshness Chaffee authorized, 
Smith implemented it even further.  He ordered a complete blockade of the island and 
forced inhabitants into reconcentration zones with anything outside these zones 
considered a target.  Smith became notorious for his quoted intent to turn Samar into a 
“howling wilderness” and eventually, his actions on Samar required Chaffee’s personal 
intervention to scale back the violence.  One officer later wrote “We did not take any 
prisoners. We shot everybody on sight.”162 
 Aside from Samar, the other area of the Philippines which still had an active 
insurgency was the Second District, Department of the Southern Luzon.  This region, not 
far south of Manila, incorporated the provinces of Bataganas, Laguna, and Tayabas.  As a 
whole, the U.S. Army often referred to it as just the Batangas region or province, or more 
widely, as Southern Luzon.  These three provinces encompassed 4,200 square miles and 
560,000 residents.  Although the impact of the war damaged the area, the region was still 
one of the wealthiest and most densely populated in the Philippines.  The district had 
been a hotbed of resistance to outside rule since the initial revolt against Spanish rule in 
the 1890s.  Many of the region’s wealthy citizens had pushed for reforms in Spanish rule 
and began organizing a rebellion when these reforms failed to appear.  For American 
soldiers stationed here, it became one of the most difficult areas to control.  The region’s 
firm support of the revolution, its difficult terrain, propensity for torrential rains, along 
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with the related mosquitoes and the diseases they carried, all combined to fight against 
American pacification efforts. 163 
BELL’S WAR 
To finally end the war here Chaffee selected James Franklin Bell and appointed 
him commander of the Third Separate Brigade. He stepped into command of the province 
with the atmosphere of frustration and reprisal on many Americans minds.  Bell had 
recently been the Provost General of Manila and before that commanded the 36th U.S. 
Volunteer Infantry Regiment in Pampanga Province, north of Manila.  His plan for 
Batangas was a blend of paternal humanitarianism and hard war philosophy learned from 
the numerous campaigns that he had fought so far.  He recognized the need to protect 
those Filipinos loyal to American rule, but would approve a broad range of reprisals for 
those who were not.  Bell's campaign in Batangas was consistent with tactics American 
forces had already employed in the Philippines, but his implementation would be a step 
further and eventually became the most thorough pacification campaign of the entire 
war.164 
 Bell had been an energetic and aggressive officer throughout his service in the 
Philippines.  As a Colonel of the 36th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, he had been awarded the 
Congressional Medal of Honor for charging seven insurgents armed only with his pistol 
and forcing three to surrender.  The action had begun because Bell and his men could 
hear heavy firing coming from a nearby town.  Bell, along with some of his officers and 
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scouts left ahead of the regiment to investigate, with the remainder of the regiment 
following behind.  Bell and the men with him encountered the enemy patrol and captured 
all seven, and although two of the insurgents had been wounded, no one on either side 
was killed in the close range exchange of fire.  Throughout the record of the 36th Infantry 
Bell appears leading patrols and attacks on enemy positions.  Even at these earlier stages 
of the war, Bell recognized the need to seize arms and capture insurgents, which would 
become key during his command in Batangas.165 
 Bell was also widely recognized as the right officer for the job.  Taft and others 
praised Bell's previous success, and they also recognized the nature of Bell's coming 
campaign.  One member of the Philippine Commission wrote,  
"He is sent to Batangas to make peace, and he proposes to do it even if the peace 
which he establishes must be the peace of desolation.  He seemed to be in a 
somewhat reflective and subdued frame of mind in the presence of an undertaking 
which may bring destruction to a once rich province and great suffering to a large 
body of people.  While the task is not of his choosing, it is clear that although he 
may expect to be vilified and have to bear the responsibility of action in many 
cases which he cannot control he seemed to have a deep determination to carry 
out his orders and to end rebellion in Batangas."166 
 
For his campaign in Batangas, Bell commanded the entire Third Separate 
Brigade.  The brigade consisted of 7,600 soldiers in two cavalry regiments and six 
infantry regiments.  In addition, Bell had nearly 700 Filipinos attached to the brigade as 
native scouts.  Bell's plans centered on controlling the population and the supplies 
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available to the insurgents, particularly weapons, and on separating the insurgents from 
their supporters in the local population.167  
 Opposing Bell was one of the best equipped and determined bands of insurgents. 
It had been led by General Miguel Malvar in Batangas province and General Juan Cailles 
in Laguna province since Aguinaldo’s proclamation of guerrilla war.  Cailles had been 
the commander that had handed the Americans their defeat at Matibac, second only to 
Balangiga in the scale of American losses and one of the only instances in which Filipino 
forces withstood an American assault.  Although Cailles was instrumental in building the 
insurgent network in this region by the summer of 1901 he had decided to surrender, 
following Aguinaldo’s capture that spring. Despite Cailles and Aguinaldo's surrender, 
and increasing pressure from former insurgents to accept American rule Malvar was 
determined to continue his resistance.168 
  Malvar proved to be one of the best leaders the Filipinos fielded throughout the 
war. His leadership was no small part in why the resistance continued for so long in the 
region. Malvar was a wealthy native of Batangas who had begun organizing 
revolutionary bands to fight the Spanish in 1896 and was known for his desire for 
complete independence.  Thanks to the efforts of Malvar and Cailles the Filipino 
resistance in these provinces was among the best organized of the war.  Malvar realized 
that he could not win by trying to outfight the American Army and instead concentrated 
his efforts on keeping control over the local population to deny the region to his 
opponents.  He relied on a strong network of local elites to lead the resistance and was 
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willing to resort to force to keep civilians from switching sides.  At least at the beginning 
of the guerrilla war, the insurgency in Batangas had more uniform support from the local 
populace than in many other regions.  In many areas where the resistance struggled to 
maintain the support of the residents, insurrectos in the second district could count on 
more popular support based on the ethnic and cultural ties as well as the fact that the 
region had been a homeland for the resistance since the original revolt against Spain.169 
As American strategy in the Philippines shifted from Benevolent Assimilation to 
counter-insurgency, American commanders began to realize they needed to attack the 
means of insurgents to wage war, and not their motivations.  If pacification had focused 
on showing Filipinos what American rule could do to benefit them, then the turn to 
counter-insurgency embodied in Bell expressed what awaited them if the insurgents 
would not surrender.  From the start of his campaign, Bell understood his mission as 
bringing about peace through a hard war.170 
The failure of the campaigns of attraction had been that they did not eliminate the 
insurgent presence, and there would always be die hard fighters that would go on fighting 
to hinder American progress.  Leaders like Malvar sought independence and would keep 
the war going as long as they were able.  Bell understood that and attempted to attack 
their means to keep fighting. Even the staunchest freedom fighters could not fight without 
food, money, and arms. 
 Once the Americans realized that their policy of attraction had allowed the 
insurgency to gain control of the civilian population, at least in those areas in which the 
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insurgency was active, they also realized that no amount of public works projects could 
get the civilians to change sides. The Americans relied on the civilian population for 
intelligence and even manpower, and the insurgents needed them as their only real source 
of supplies.  If one side could isolate the civilians from the other, they could effectively 
control a town or province, even if a large enemy force was present.  For insurgents, they 
isolated the civilians through intimidation and their shadow government.  For Americans, 
they did so by offering civilians protection, aid, or even threats.  Bell understood this 
dynamic as well as any American officer in the entire war.  His campaign to end the 
insurgency in Southern Luzon would be the most complete and efficient campaign of the 
Philippine-American War.171 
 The American policies in the Philippines had always assumed the full right of 
America to control the islands.  In the mindset of the period America had gained the 
islands legally through its peace treaty with Spain and America was the lawful authority 
of the land.  McKinley’s administration had delayed in coming up with a cohesive policy 
towards the Philippines, and in some ways, the Army had defaulted into its role as civil 
administrators and counter-guerrilla fighters.172 
 Bell's view on the United States’ right to be in the islands followed a similar 
logic.  When he assumed command of the Third Separate Brigade he argued as much in 
his speech to his officers. Bell’s position was that Americans were the rightful rulers of 
the Philippines and that the resistance to American rule was an insurrection.  Because an 
insurrection opposed lawful American rule, then the U.S. Army could implement 
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measures to defeat it as outlined by General Orders 100. Bell’s tenure as commander was 
not the first time the American military had made use of General Orders 100 during the 
war, but Bell frequently cited sections of it in his orders to his command.  Bell went so 
far as to issue a copy of General Orders 100 to every officer in his brigade.173 
 When Bell spoke to his officers, he explained that he planned to make the 
insurgents want peace.  Bell viewed Batangas as the center of the insurgency.  He clearly 
outlined a plan to root out anyone that was helping the insurgents, in particular among the 
Filipino elite.  Bell suspected that the insurgency in the area under his command relied on 
the support of local landowners and officials who benefited from continuing the 
rebellion.  By subjecting those who supported the insurgency to hardship and breaking 
their contact with the insurgent forces Bell believed he could bring about an end to the 
war.  He understood his mission in Batangas to be forcing the insurgents to surrender and 
bring about peace even if it meant hardship for the civilians and in fact by waging a hard 
war could achieve peace more quickly.174 
Following his speech to his officers, Bell began issuing telegraphic circulars to his 
command.  Bell distributed the circulars to all the stations under his command, and he 
wrote them as standing orders for the duration of the campaign.  Bell’s circulars outlined 
the ways in which he intended to bring an end to the insurgency on an almost point by 
point basis.  If his speech to his officers was a summation of his philosophy, then his 
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telegraphic circulars became the practical embodiment, although they often included 
further justifications for the actions that Bell took. 
Bell’s orders can be broken down into a few categories.  Some dealt with specific 
tactics to combat the insurgency and destroy their means to wage war.  Other circulars 
dealt with policing the garrisoned areas, mainly by targeting what Bell thought was the 
biggest source of insurgent support, the wealthy citizens, and officials who had not 
demonstrated loyalty to the Americans.  In more mundane circulars Bell issued reminders 
to his men to be vigilant or not to abuse the leeway he had given them in hunting 
insurgents.  Bell's campaign began shortly after, and was concurrent with, Smith’s 
excesses on Samar, and Bell had previously acknowledged the extremes to which his men 
had gone to gain information from insurgents.  He certainly had some reason to worry 
about further incidents causing problems in his command.175  
The final category which encompasses a significant amount of Bell’s circulars 
deals with food.  Bell saw the food supply in the provinces under his control as part of the 
means of the insurgents to wage war.  If he could attack and destroy their food supply, he 
could bring a quicker end to the conflict. In essence, siege out the entire region to starve 
the insurgency into submission.  It was not his only tactic, but it played a role in his 
overall plan to end the insurgency.  As militarily sound as this might have been, it soon 
caused problems for the civilian population, and many of his orders reflect a growing 
food shortage because of the American campaign. 
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Before Bell could secure the insurgent's supply caches and food, he had to isolate 
their supporters.  The keystone to Bell’s plan for Southern Luzon and the most 
controversial of his orders was Circular Number Two. In it, Bell officially ordered all of 
the civilians in the area of the Third Brigade to be relocated into American-controlled 
towns.176 From his second circular dated December 8th, 1901,  
"In order to put an end to enforced contributions, now levied by 
insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled an outlying barrios and 
districts, by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers 
of all towns now existing in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, 
including those at which no garrison is stationed at present, will 
immediately specify and establish plainly marked limited surrounding 
each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an 
average size garrison, to exercise supervision over and furnish protection 
to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of 
armed insurgents.  These limits may include the barrios which exist 
sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the 
garrison and should include some ground on which livestock can graze, 
but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched.  All ungarrisoned 
towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available. 
Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and 
distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of town over which 
they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining 
outside of these limits and that unless they move by December 25th from 
outlying barrios and districts with all their movable food supplies, 
including rice, palay, chickens, livestock, etc., to within the limits of the 
zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found 
outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or 
destruction."177 
This second circular was Bell’s clear message on how he intended to wage the 
coming campaign. The order laid out how his soldiers would separate friend and foe.  
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Each town in the province was turned into a fortified garrison with clear limits that 
established an American zone of control around the given town.  Americans forced the 
Filipinos to move into these garrisons or “reconcentration zones.”  Any person that stayed 
outside the zones would be in danger, and any property could be seized or destroyed.  
 This tactic was not without precedent, both by American troops, and other 
colonial powers as well.  The British had built concentration camps during the Anglo-
Boer War, and the Spanish had used them Cuba.178  The term carries more weight to a 
post-World War Two audience, a more fitting term from modern usage might be 
internment camps.  Whatever the name, the American public reviled the camps.  Their 
use by Spain had been widely denounced in the United States, and the Spanish General 
Weyler had received his nickname of “Butcher Weyler” in part for his use of 
reconcentration camps.  Chaffee considered Bell's policy so potentially damaging that he 
asked for the letter about it to Secretary Root to be destroyed.179  When the American 
public found out about their use in the Philippines, there were loud outcries and observers 
noted the similarities between Bell's actions and Weyler's policies in Cuba.180 
 As many as 170,000 civilians may have died in Weyler's camps.  Weyler, who 
had admired General Sherman, dismissed the idea that his camps were unusually harsh, 
and he used the American Civil War as an example.  When asked by Fitzhugh Lee about 
his camps, Weyler responded, "Everything is fair in war."181  A Spanish ambassador to 
Washington cited Sheridan's and Sherman's campaigns in the Civil War, and the 
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"Burning of entire cities, the ruin and devastation of immense and most fertile regions, to 
the annihilation of all goods of the adversary."182 
 American garrisons formed the camps from existing towns and garrisons.  
Soldiers forced outlying civilians to move into towns under American control.  Bell 
allowed garrison commanders to implement the order to their discretion, and there was 
variance from town to town, often based on the capability of the garrison and the history 
of that town.  In quiet areas of the province that had seen limited or even no fighting the 
Filipinos had much more freedom to be out of the camps during the day.  Towns with 
particularly small garrisons, often the same places as the previous example, were 
unofficially allowed to go without rounding up all the inhabitants from the surrounding 
countryside and continue their duties as before.183 
 Despite these exceptions, civilians tightly packed the zones with simple shacks 
hastily built to accommodate the massive influx of residents.  This order ostensibly 
protected inhabitants from insurgent forces, but it had other desired outcomes as well.  
With it, Bell created a clear line of friend or foe for his soldiers.  American soldiers 
measured the limits of the zones in hundreds of yards, effectively rifle range, and labeled 
these lines as a "dead line.”184  Anyone found beyond the line was subject to be arrested 
or even shot without question.  People within the zones were at least publicly not 
insurgents and guaranteed protection from insurgent retaliation.  To American soldiers, 
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anyone that remained outside the zones was an insurgent or potentially supporting 
them.185  
 Bell’s tactics, used by other American officers in Samar has parallels in modern 
wars as well, just as his hard war has parallels to previous conflicts. It was to be a “war 
among the people”, much like the ones the French experienced in Indochina and Algeria, 
or the British in Malaysia.  If NATO had a “shape, clear, hold, and build” formula to 
fighting in Afghanistan186, then Bell’s slogan could have been “shape, clear, hold, and 
burn.”  
Bell’s separation of the population and insurgents created kinds of safe zones for 
his soldiers where they could operate in relative security in their garrisons and affect 
control over the civilian population.  This tactic was not without precedent and it has 
been used since. The British used concentration camps against the Boers, and during the 
Vietnam War, American and South Vietnamese forces relocated civilians into protected 
villages in an attempt to separate enemy combatants from the population.187  
In addition to making the rules of engagement outside the garrisons simpler, the 
order also moved the insurgent supply base out of their control.  The insurgents had been 
living off the supplies they could get from locals and moving the locals inside American 
controlled areas meant that Bell now controlled the main food supply.  Americans 
destroyed any supplies that they did not bring inside the zones, leaving the insurgents to 
																																								 																				
185 May, Battle for Batangas, 1991, 249–51. 
186 Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, First Edition (Milton Park, 




live off a land that been wiped clean of supplies.  The American troops in Batangas began 
a thorough effort to destroy anything that was left in the countryside that could be used 
by insurgents.  Filipinos left buildings, crops, livestock, and whatever other supplies they 
could not bring.  Soldiers gathered up and burned whatever was left in the countryside.  
In one of the first expeditions of the new year, which lasted just over a week, Bell's men 
destroyed 1400 tons of rice and palay, killed 200 carabaos, 800 cattle, 680 horses, and 
burned 6,000 homes.188  
This aggressive campaign later caused problems for the population of Batangas.  
As Bell’s command of the province went on, the civilian population began to experience 
major food shortages.  Filipinos attempted to grow crops in and around the now crowded 
towns, but could not provide enough food to replace all that the Americans destroyed.  
Despite its negative impact on civilians, it proved effective against the insurgents, for 
without farmers to aid them, they had to forage what little food they could find, leaving 
them malnourished and having to spend much of their time searching for food.189 
 The policy offered another benefit for Americans.  It allowed American troops to 
better  protect Filipinos who had proved their loyalty to the American government.  
Insurgents had targeted not just American troops, but also people suspected of working 
with the Americans.  The inability to protect loyal Filipinos created a problem, and 
Americans had to show that they could enforce their rule and protect anyone willing to 
																																								 																				




declare loyalty to the United States.  Bell sought to remove the fear of reprisal from 
Filipino civilians so that they would work with the Americans.190 
 Conditions in the camps varied in some degree from town to town.  In some, 
farmers could leave to harvest crops, others had much tighter control, and farming was 
limited plots of land to grow crops within the zones.  The civilian population in the area 
under bell's command was around 300,000. One town grew from 5,000 to 30,000, the city 
of Lipa held 43,000.  These dense populations became susceptible to disease, which was 
exacerbated by major food shortages brought on by the destruction of large stores of food 
by American troops.  Between January and May, 1902 over 11,000 Filipinos died in 
Batangas.  While these deaths were not the direct result of American action, Bell's 
policies certainly contributed to them.191  
In Circular Number Three Bell blamed the population of Batangas for the 
continuation of the conflict.  He believed that most of the Filipinos supported the 
insurrection while claiming to want peace.  He was enacting his orders to, "Make the 
people want peace and want it badly."192  This circular was a clear statement about his 
philosophy of a hard war to bring about peace.  He went on to write, "A short and severe 
war creates in the aggregate less loss and suffering than benevolent war indefinitely 
prolonged."193   
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Circular Three was one of the longest Bell issued and goes on to detail the way in 
which Bell planned to break up the insurgent network.  He told his men to make use of a 
network spies, loyal police, native scouts and provost courts to break up the insurgent 
network and to put pressure on the wealthy Filipinos and officials suspected of aiding the 
insurgency.194 
Although Circular Four has received less attention than his circular detailing 
reconcentration, it shows the extreme limit to which Bell was willing to go to prosecute 
this war. In it, Bell laid out a list of charges against the Filipino combatants and alleged 
crimes against the laws of war and the U.S. government, specifically in violation of G.O. 
100.  The crimes included assassination, killing American wounded, booby traps, 
intimidation of civilians, violating pardons, and treason.  Because of these violations, Bell 
authorized executions in retaliation for any assassination against an American or loyal 
Filipino.  Any execution was to be specifically for retaliating against an assassination by 
insurgents and was conducted by picking a prisoner by lot, preferably one from the town 
where an assassination had happened.195 
In the following circular, Bell authorized another form of retaliation.  Station 
commanders could burn down Filipino property equivalent to whatever the insurgents 
destroyed of American property.  They were encouraged to burn down property that 
belonged to Filipino officials that Americans suspected of aiding the insurgents.  Bell 
specifically recommended numbering the telegraph poles in each district and assigning 
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each one to a Filipino.  If insurgents destroyed a telegraph pole, it would be the 
responsibility of that individual to repair it.196  
 Insurgents had made use of terror and intimidation to keep civilians loyal that 
included public assassinations of those known to support the Americans.  In the war, both 
sides showed a willingness to resort to intimidation and terror as a means of coercion.  
Both sides needed civilian support and used force to gain it when other means failed.197  
Bell also reinstated a Spanish law requiring labor as a tax imposed on the local 
population.  Filipinos could also pay three pesos to get out of the labor requirement, but if 
they could not then they were required to work for the Americans to repair roads, bridges, 
and telegraph lines.  Bell eventually authorized the money raised from this tax to pay for 
food and used the labor to repair roads.  He restricted movement and trade between 
towns.  Bell also issued an order to disarm the native police, which was separate from the 
native auxiliary scouts the U.S. Army had been using effectively.  Bell suspected the 
police in many towns of having ties to the insurgency and suspected them of smuggling 
arms and money to Malvar's forces.198 
Bell made arms a primary objective of his campaign and authorized his men to 
pay up to thirty pesos for a serviceable firearm.  At the same time, the reward for an 
officer’s capture was only five or ten pesos depending on their rank.  Later on, Bell 
reminded his men that they should take any weapon even it was not serviceable by the 
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army’s standards.  He went so far as to encourage his men to pay up to twenty pesos for 
shotguns and revolvers, weapons which were not commonly used against American 
forces, as a way to get more Filipinos to turn in firearms.  The emphasis had been a part 
of Bell’s time as a regimental commander and had been a major objective for American 
forces throughout the war.  Bell also ordered that all native horses were to be turned in 
and accounted for and that even his men could not use them unless authorized.  He 
ordered Filipinos to turn in their bolos and knives, except for a few more peaceful areas 
where they could have them dulled by a blacksmith instead.  These were all means with 
which an insurgent could fight back against the Americans and Bell placed a clear 
priority on capturing as many weapons as he could.199 
Throughout Bell’s circulars, he issued general reminders to his troops and 
warnings to the Filipinos.  While these are somewhat less specific, they continue to show 
Bell’s intent and reasoning.  He reminded his men to be vigilant and always armed, and 
he wrote that he expected his orders would cause a strong response.  He was obviously 
aware of the potential for another Balangiga, even going so far as to cite that attack 
specifically as a warning to his men.  He wanted to avoid any opportunity for the 
insurgency to gain a victory.  He also warned the Filipinos that if a town did rise up 
against its garrison that it would be completely burned.  The warnings to his men and the 
Filipinos mimic the attack at Balangiga for a reason, the American’s there were caught 
without weapons and the retaliatory burning the town was well known by this point.200  
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In all of his circulars, Bell assumed the guilt of the Filipinos of violating G.O. 100 
and that they all likely had supported the insurgency to some degree during the war.  
Therefore all Filipinos bore at least some of the responsibility for what was now 
happening.  There was clearly an impact on all of the Filipinos within Bell’s command.  
Bell's campaign severely compounded existing food shortages.  Bell recognized the 
public health problem his campaign created and began a public vaccination campaign that 
eventually vaccinated nearly the entire population of Batangas.201  Bell also issued some 
of his circulars in direct response to the food shortages and sought to import rice to help 
alleviate the humanitarian crisis.  Bell eventually allowed Filipinos to accompany 
American patrols so they could find and bring back food for themselves.202 
Bell’s campaign in Batangas was not just limited to concentration and martial 
law.  He also ordered his commanders to send out patrols constantly searching for 
insurgent bands.  Bell’s forces pursued Malvar's bands far into insurgent territory.  By 
late February what remained of Malvar's army was close to capitulation with only a few 
bands left in the field along with Malvar himself.  To speed up to the defeat of insurgent 
forces, Americans also began to put captured insurgents on trial for violations of G.O. 
100 unless they gave the Americans useful service or intelligence, which usually resulted 
in the capture of more insurgents, weapons, or supplies.203 
																																								 																				
201 Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, 2000, 154. 
202 Bell and Davis, Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders Regulating Campaign against Insurgents 
and Proclamations and Circular Letters Relating to Reconstruction after Close of War in the Provinces of 
Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro, Philippine Islands, 14–17, 21, 26–27. 
203 May, Battle for Batangas, 1991, 260–62.	
96	
	
Bell clearly articulated his idea of a hard war in his many orders.  In his early 
orders, Bell stated his desire to bring about peace and to accomplish that he planned to 
make continued resistance unbearable for the remaining insurgents.  His later orders 
contain many reminders to his soldiers to show restraint and not bring undue hardship on 
the civilians around them.  Despite his softening and realization of the problems that this 
campaign had created, Bell remained committed to bringing about peace through a hard 
war and his methods worked.  Malvar and his remaining men surrendered at the 
beginning of April.  Malvar and his officers attributed the effectiveness of Bell’s 
campaign to the reconcentration zones and Bell’s persistent pursuit of the insurgents.  
One officer claimed that they could have kept fighting for three more years without 
reconcentration.  Malvar himself said at the time of his surrender that “I found myself 
without a single gun or clerk…all my staff officers had already fallen into the hands of 
the Americans.”204 
Bell took command in December 1901.  His first circulars were dated in mid-
December, and by mid-April 1902 he had accepted Malvar’s surrender.  It took him four 
months to reduce one of the last strongholds of insurgent activity in the Philippines.  With 
Samar before it and now Batangas and the other provinces of Southern Luzon pacified, 
the U.S. was able to claim that the war was over and in July of 1902 President Roosevelt 
declared the war won. Sporadic fighting and even major campaigns continued long after 
Roosevelt’s declaration. However, the war against anything that resembled a Filipino 
national movement was over.  
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Bell’s campaign had succeeded in bringing an end to resistance in Batangas by 
enacting a hard war on the Filipino insurgents.  He succeeded where commanders for two 
years had failed to end the insurgency.  He emerged from the war as one of the premier 
counter-insurgency officers in the Army.  His campaign had caused great hardship for the 
civilians that lived through it and contributed to a dire humanitarian crisis both during 
and afterward.  Despite this, his campaign still stands as a success over an indigenous 
guerrilla army.  Bell’s circulars lay out a comprehensive counter-insurgency plan that 
brought about an end to the war.  His plan was based on his experience as well as the 
previous half century of the U.S. Army’s campaigns and shared strategies with America's 
European rivals. Because of the nature of the campaign and the Philippine-American 
War, it has largely been forgotten or treated as a sideshow to American military history.  
However, the Philippine-American War is linked to the long story of the U.S. Army, 









In Cheyenne, Wyoming, at the Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, there is a 
reminder of the Philippine-American War, two of the Balangiga Bells.  When American 
troops returned to Balangiga following the Filipino attack, they sacked the town and took 
the church bells as a prize.  They stayed with the 9th Infantry Regiment for a time and one 
of the three bells is still with the unit at its base in South Korea.  The remaining two were 
brought back to then Fort D.A. Russell by the 11th Infantry Regiment which had replaced 
the 9th Infantry Regiment in garrisoning Balangiga.  Officials from the Philippines have 
asked for the bells to be returned on several occasions.  Other church bells from the war 
have been returned, but so far the Balangiga Bells have remained in U.S. hands.205  The 
bells are a little-known reminder of the war in the same way that the war itself is 
frequently a footnote to the Spanish-American War. 
But the Philippine-American war, regardless of how well it is remembered, is an 
important link in the history of the American way of war.  As a conflict it shares many of 
the traits and influences of those wars which historians debate more often. Just as the 
Union entered the Civil War with a policy of reconciliation, the American government 
began the Philippine war with a “policy of attraction.”  While not completely alike, they 
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shared similar qualities in that enemy noncombatants were off limits, and their way of 
life was to be left as undisturbed as possible in order to win them over.  For the American 
South in the Civil War, there were only limited initial incursions that sought to avoid 
large scale destruction of property and economy.  The harshest measures of G.O. 100, 
adopted during the war for the very situation the Union encountered - fighting among 
civilians in hostile territory - were not carried out to the fullest.  In the Philippines, the 
American policy of attraction in some ways went even further initially to avoid alienating 
the Filipino population. The U.S. government actively tried to win popular support 
among Filipinos through government programs and construction efforts.  
Even when the war turned to stern measures, the U.S. showed some restraint.  
Sherman’s March was limited in destruction to its immediate area; likewise, Sheridan’s 
campaign through the Shenandoah Valley.  Neither Sherman or Sheridan resorted to 
wanton killing and they focused the destruction of goods on things useful to the Southern 
war effort, which provided some measure of restraint to their raids. 
When Bell began his own hard war, he imposed harsh measures on the Filipino 
civilians that went beyond tactics employed during the Civil War.  Two examples were 
the large-scale relocation of the population and what amounted to free fire zones outside 
of American garrisons.  Even then, Bell showed at least some restraint, making efforts to 
keep the population under his control fed and supplied.  While the population suffered 
from disease and many died, the American forces were not carrying out a program of 
execution.  When Bell’s orders brought about victory, civilians were allowed to return 
home and rebuild.  It may seem like a narrow distinction, but it is an important one.  
Bell’s war was a hard war, not a war of annihilation. 
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At the end of each conflict, civilian life was largely intact, although the loss of life 
from famine was significant as a result of Bell’s campaign.  In both the American South 
and Batangas civilians lost goods and property on a large scale.  At the end of the 
conflict, they had the chance to resume their lives and in some cases emerged largely 
unscathed.  
His orders were designed to end the enemy’s capability to resist, not to bring 
about full-scale destruction.  It may be little comfort to those that suffered, but Bell’s 
harsh orders combined with serious efforts at restraint are the hallmarks of a hard war and 
distinct from a war of annihilation or total war.  It was not the extirpative war of colonial 
Americans against Native peoples, nor was it a limited war in which non-combatants 
were off limits.  Like others before and after, Bell’s commands showed willingness to use 
military superiority to destroy the enemy’s capability to fight by exposing noncombatants 
to danger and deprivation in order to end the conflict.  
The American pacification campaign and Bell's campaign in Batangas were 
ultimately fought as hard wars.  There are two main caveats to that assessment.  The first 
is that is that the war was frequently balanced with the Army’s social programs, such as 
school construction and public health programs.206  The second that the war was locally 
fought with widespread differences. Two garrisons within just Bell’s area of command 
may have carried out the war quite differently.  Bell's orders demonstrate that he granted 
his officers considerable leeway, especially in those areas without significant conflict.  
However, even with these caveats, the essence of a hard war was still there.  Bell’s 
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campaign was not the only instance, but perhaps the clearest example.  Just as Sherman 
was willing to burn and destroy whatever might aid the Confederacy, Bell was willing to 
burn and destroy whatever might aid the insurgents and to separate them from the 
population that supported them.  Bell’s war was one of hardship to end the war.  He saw 
hard war as the quickest path to peace, a peace that would only incorporate his enemies 
once they capitulated.  
The Philippine-American War was a counter-insurgency war.  These kinds of 
conflicts have dominated recent American military history.  Twentieth and now twenty-
first-century armies have been plagued by the problem of counter-insurgency wars.207  
Those conflicts are often frustrating and seemingly unwinnable.  Yet, as Max Boot 
claims, the Philippine-American War was “one of the most successful 
counterinsurgencies waged by a Western army in modern times.”208 The U.S. Army, 
through commanders like Bell, was willing to resort to hard war to achieve that success.   
Yet in recent insurgencies like Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. has not resorted to a 
hard war.  For much of those conflicts, the U.S. military kept clear rules of engagement in 
place in order to protect non-combatants.  Even though these twenty-firstst century wars 
share similarities to the Philippine-American War, the use of small local garrisons to 
control as much territory as possible, an influx of soldiers to actively patrol and maintain 
supply lines, and the uncertainty about who exactly was an enemy combatant, there were 
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still  clear limits.  American and Coalition forces did not resort to targeting non-
combatants as a strategy to win the war.  
Perhaps the best examples of when U.S. forces were willing to cross that 
threshold is to look to wars prior to the Philippine-American War, such as the campaigns 
against Native Americans and the Civil War.  Bell’s campaign is in essence another 
example of the kind of warfare that Grenier explored in his book on Colonial and Early 
American warfare against Native Americans.209  While Bell certainly did not aim to 
annihilate the Filipino population, as English settlers were when dealing with Native 
Americans, his tactics share more than just common themes with the extirpative wars 
waged by colonists in early North America.   In fact, after examining the Philippine-
American war in more detail, we have to accept that hard war is not the exception but the 
main undercurrent that links conflicts from the early colonies until at least Bell’s 
campaign in the Philippine-American War, and a number of recent U.S. conflicts in the 
twentieth and twenty-first century.  
Bell’s explanation of hard war through his telegraphic circulars match the tactics 
that Sherman and Sheridan employed and embraced.  Despite the Army’s efforts during 
the nineteenth century to focus and prepare for an outward opponent - a possible British 
or French invasion – it spent most of its time fighting what were then called small or 
minor wars; what we would now call counter-insurgencies or unconventional wars.  After 
the War of 1812, the threat of European invasion never materialized again in the United 
States.  It served only as a theoretical exercise and the harbor forts that were built to 
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counter such an invasion saw their only combat during the Civil War.  Instead, the U.S. 
Army primarily fought unconventional wars at home and abroad.210 
 As a military force, the U.S. Army became quite adept at fighting small wars, and 
even during more conventional wars, it resorted to using the lessons learned from small 
wars against major opponents, as Sherman and Sheridan proved.  Those campaigns were 
attacks on the opponent’s ability to continue fighting by pressuring noncombatants, a 
hard war.  They were larger in scale from the way of war practiced against Native 
Americans, but relatable.  Bell’s campaign in Batangas was not a leap or even an 
evolution of the concept; it was a way of war he and the U.S. Army knew how to fight 
and had long been fighting. 
Bell was a career officer, a lieutenant only a few years before the outbreak of the 
Philippine-American war. When he was tasked with defeating a capable insurgent force, 
he resorted to a hard war.  This strategy had begun with MacArthur and the intelligence 
victories that uncovered the revolutionary shadow government and it was carried to its 
fullest with Bell’s campaign in Batangas.  It was a key to U.S. victory in the Philippines, 
despite its toll on the Philippine population. As Bell and others saw it, this was the most 
expedient way to end the war. Harsh but short, to avoid a prolonged conflict.  It was a 
way of war which showed up throughout American military history that would be 
recognizable to both Bell’s predecessors and successors. 
The Philippine-American War set the stage for many later American interventions 
throughout the twentieth century.  While it was not the first time the United States had 
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ventured overseas militarily, it was the largest by a wide margin to that date.  Once the 
United States had exercised its imperial muscle it would do so again in Central and South 
America in the 1920s and 1930s.  While covert government operations to topple rulers 
are somewhat removed from the Philippine-American War, it is impossible to ignore the 
similarities between the conflict and many of the later wars America would fight.  From 
fortified villages in Vietnam to the remote outposts trying to catch up with under armed 
insurgents in Afghanistan, America fought these kinds of wars before.  America has 
waged successful hard war for a long time, yet the modern attempts to fight insurgencies 
have resulted in frustration, even with major campaigns to win local support and separate 
the population from insurgents.  The lesson from the Philippines is that America could 
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